OBSERVATIONS

ON

A PAMPHLET, ENTITLED,

A Short History of Opposition,

During the last Session of Parliament.

WITH

A POSTSCRIPT TO THE AUTHOR.

CONTAINING,

Some seasonable Strictures on his Arguments in support of a *corrupt Influence* in the Crown, and its necessary Operation upon a *factious* and *servile Majority* of the other Two Branches of the Legislature.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED,

AN ADDRESS

TO

Messrs. WEDDERBURNE, GIBBON and Mc PHERSON.

BY A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT.

LONDON:
PRINTED FOR W. DAVIS ON LUDGATE HILL.
M DCC LXXIX.

4 Aug 1779

Meſſieurs WEDDERBURNE, GIBBON and M'PHERSON,

THE following ſheets are ſpecially recommended by the Author, to your moſt ſerious peruſal; I muſt confeſs more to pleaſe the public, than from any private motive or opinion of my own. Two * of you, at leaſt, are pretty well informed of the ſubjects herein treated; and though a perſon aroſe from the dead, if you are not already convinced of the facts and the concluſions drawn from them, I am perſuaded you will never be converted, till *convenience* and *intereſt* flaſh *conviction* on your minds. One † of you gentlemen, has been *twice converted* before, and it may be well preſumed, after ſo many *retrograde* motions, and ſtationary poſitions, that the *next move* will fix you for life; and in ſpite of that mercury in your compoſition, and that *propenſity* to change, which *in* Mr. Attor-

* Mr. Wedderburne and Mr. Gibbon, are Members of the Houſe of Commons.

† Mr. Wedderburne firſt ſpoke and voted with the court. He afterwards went violently into oppoſition, and has for ſeveral years fought under the miniſterial ſtandard.

ney General is *habit* as well as *nature*, that a bolſtered ſeat in the hall, and a writ of entry into another aſſembly, by gratifying at once your *ambition* and your *avarice*, which hitherto have proved as *boundleſs* as your *pride*, will introduce a degree of tranquillity into your breaſt, to which it has ever been a ſtranger.

I am, Sir, far from imputing the *Hiſtory* of the *Oppoſition* to you. It is therefore with ſome reluctance I addreſs you on the preſent occaſion, but the public, whoſe humble retainer I am, have pointed you out: and deſire the grounds of perſuaſion on which their judgment reſts may be proclaimed; they have directed me to *report* their reaſons, and I have now no choice of my own; my *duty* calls me, and I *muſt* obey.

The moſt conſiderable number of thoſe with whom I have the honour to converſe, ſay, that you, Mr. Attorney General, are the author of the Short Hiſtory. They imagine, that they can *deſcry* in that performance, the ſame *petulence*, *ſelf-conceit*, *law-ſubtilty*, bar *chicane*, *quaintneſs* of expreſſion, thread-bare antitheſis, ſyſtematic evaſion, *nothingneſs* and *emptineſs*, which diſtinguiſh your frothy harangues in the ſenate houſe. I give no opinion myſelf on the ſubject; but when I have ſtated my doubts, they have replied with warmth. The publication which we have deſired you to anſwer is *laboured*; it is *ſhallow*,

low, and yet ſpecious and well calculated to make proſelytes among men of a certain ſize of underſtanding, or ſuch as come down to the Houſe, and wiſh for a *decent* apology, for giving a *venal vote*.---The *Hiſtory* is puerile and jejune: In ſhort, they *inſiſt* that it is a compound of *frivolity* and *impoſition*, replete with *falſhood*, and that *conſequently* the production is *yours*.

It is in vain to contend with numbers, I ſeemingly ſubmitted, but I was nevertheleſs reſolved *not* to relinquiſh my opinion entirely; I ſaid, if Mr. Wedderburne be the faſhioner of this curious production, give me leave ſtill to ſay, a word or two in juſtification.——He may be the Author, vulgarly ſo called; but I ſtill contend, that he never created or begot it; though I am ready to confeſs, that he might have diſcharged the ſeveral friendly offices of man-midwife, nurſe and god-father, for his earthly creators the junto.——But ſince the laſt interview which I have had with my worthy patrons, the public, a thought ſtruck me, that greatly ſtaggers me, encreaſes my doubts, and induces me to believe, that you could have taken no part, principal or ſubordinate, in bringing the Short Hiſtory into being; and I will tell you candidly my reaſon.

There are ſeveral paſſages ſcattered through the book, highly reflecting on the *people* of

America, warmly recommending vigorous meaſures, and lamenting the opportunities which were loſt, through the neglect or unſkilfulneſs of our generals. I am not yet prepared to believe, that the man who ſo often *wept* in St. Stephen's chapel, over the miſeries of his American fellow ſubjects, at the *cruelties* and acts of injuſtice daily inflicting, and the horrid torments preparing for them by a *traiterous junto*, and a *wicked* unprincipled adminiſtration*, could have maintained in *print*, that the *ſword* ſhould *never* be ſheathed, till America was brought *proſtrate* with an *haltar* about her neck, to the *feet* of Great Britain, "in the hour of her inſolence †."

I forbear to quote many other inſtances, to confirm me, that you are *not* the author of the publication in queſtion: one however, I cannot paſs over; it was a remarkable circumſtance, and is worthy of *recording*.

I recollect juſt before any of the injurious meaſures reſpecting America was thought on, upon a motion made by your then co-patriot, Mr. Burke, in the Houſe of Commons, containing a ſtring of reſolutions, which if agreed to, would lay a foundation for a vote of cen-

* Vide Mr. Wedderburne's ſpeeches in parliament in the years 1768 and 1769, & *paſſim*, till the death of Mr. G. Grenville in the winter 1770.

† A favourite expreſſion of that great patriot Governor Johnſtone before he was metamorphoſed into a Commodore.

ſure

ſure on the Secretary of State for the American department, that you proved yourſelf a moſt able advocate, for your brother patriots on the other ſide of the Atlantic. You inſiſted*, that the noble Lord who preſided at that department; indeed you did not heſitate to name him, you ſaid *Lord Hillſborough* deſerved to be *impeached*, and in the warmth of an old Roman, when "Rome was Rome," or rather in a *paroxyſm* or *inflation* of the *amor patriæ*, you pledged yourſelf to the Houſe that you yourſelf, if no other perſon undertook the taſk, would *exhibit articles* againſt his Lordſhip, for the *pernicious advice* he had given his ſovereign reſpecting America, and being the active cauſe of thoſe injuries ſuffered by the moſt deſerving ſubjects that ever lived, through the means of thoſe pernicious counſels*: but the moſt ſtriking circumſtance however of all was, and which as long as memory holds a place in my brain, I ſhall never forget; becauſe it was delivered in the ſpirit of prophecy and ſhewed you were gifted, which does not always happen to be the caſe on ſuch occaſions.——Not the *Delphian* prieſteſs ever ſpoke with a more *contorted* countenance, or felt ſtronger *throes*. Inflation being the great ſource of prediction, a words being but wind, you *diſburthened* yo ſelf, in the following prophetic words:

* Vide Mr. Wedderburne's ſpeech in he Ho e Commons, on the 9th of May, 1770.

" *America*

" *America, that formed part of the Britiſh*
" *Empire in the reign of George the Second, will*
" *be for ever diſſevered from it in the reign of*
" *George the Third* *." Theſe were your words. I took them down in my place at the inſtant, and you are welcome to peruſe the original note at any time, you may *want* it, to *aſſiſt* your *recollection*.

Theſe are ſome of the *reaſons*, which induce me to *doubt*, that you are the Author of the Short Hiſtory of Oppoſition, and I believe the impartial and intelligent part of my readers, will neither accuſe me of *obſtinacy* or *ſcepticiſm*, in confeſſing that they ſtill continue to have great weight with me, maugre all the efforts of many of my friends, to bring me over to their opinion.

To you, Mr. Gibbon, I had a great deal to ſay, but I have forgot it. The pamphlet abounds in a kind of inaccurate ſprightly declamation, very different from that ſolemn gait and ſelf-important air which accompanies you, and marks your footſteps through the regions of dulneſs and infidelity.

Your apoſtacy from God and your country, are of too recent a date, to entitle you to the confidence of thoſe who would employ you, if they ſhall find you *good for any thing*. Lord

* Vide the concluſion of Mr. Wedderburne's ſpeech the ſame day.

North

North hired you, as a faithful ſervant; but as it is not in his province to ſet you your taſk, neither had he the fixing of your appointments. The one muſt be ſettled as the other was decreed, in *another* place beſides Downing Street, and believe me, for perhaps you do *not* know it, his Lordſhip acts preciſely the part of the maſter of a regiſter office.---His buſineſs is to *prefer*, not to determine or finally chuſe, much leſs to fix the quantum of wages. Your duty and intereſt make it neceſſary you ſhould look *another* way. Come forth as a *volunteeer*; plunge deeper, *if poſſible* into political apoſtacy and ingratitude, and your fortune will be built, as on a rock. Abuſe Oppoſition, and *betray* their ſecrets, if they were ſo ſimple as to truſt you with any; and throw out oblique cenſures on Adminiſtration, to remind them at once of their *blunders*, and ſtate of *dependance* on thoſe, whoſe leaſt ſymptom of diſpleaſure *fills* their breaſts with *terror* and diſmay, and you may at length arrive to the exalted diſtinction of ſitting ſide by ſide, with my old brother member, Mr. Bamber Gaſcoigne, who will after reſtoring the navy of England, to its former power and ſplendour, probably ſhew you the way to the treaſury board and treaſury bench.

I think I have at length diſcovered the *ſecret*. Mr. M'Pherſon is the man; none but the "author of *Modeſtus*," the celebrated anſwerer

anſwerer of Junius, could emulate that writer's ſtile; beſides the veterans are all gone to Greenwich and Chelſea; the two Doctors* are now almoſt ſuperannuated; Mr. Lind is writing the life and panegyric of Lord Mansfield; and compiling, in five volumes in folio, the *negotiations* of his nephew, at the Imperial and French courts; and Sir John Dalrymple is too buſily engaged in recruiting in the Highlands, to attend to politics. His next hiſtorical romance, has not yet received the final touch of the French notary, who has had the inventing, as well as the copying of it committed to his charge; ſo that the taſk of reviling Oppoſition has neceſſarily fallen, Sir, to your lot; you began with poor Junius; you next attacked old Homer, both of whom you have cruelly mangled; and you have, literally ſpeaking, disfigured Oppoſition. The opinion I entertain of the work and the Author, however, may be better collected from the following obſervations, than from any thing which could properly come in the ſhape of an introductory epiſtle. I therefore beg leave to refer Mr. M'Pherſon to the Obſervations for further particulars.

I have only to add, that I have the honour to ſubſcribe myſelf,

Gentlemen, your's, &c.

The AUTHOR.

* Johnſon and Shebbeare.

OBSERVATIONS

ON A

SHORT HISTORY, &c.

There are people ſo very regardleſs of truth, and ſo very indifferent to the ſhame of being convicted of falſehood, that they never conſider, when they affirm any thing more than the *preſent expediency*.

BOLINGBROKE.

HOW far the foregoing obſervation will be ſtrictly verified in the courſe of the following ſtrictures, muſt reſt with the intelligent and unprejudiced reader to determine. Neither the author of the "Short Hiſtory, "&c." nor I, will be permitted to act in the capacity of judges before ſo reſpectable a tribunal. The proofs on either hand will come nakedly before the public. As ſoon as they are cloſed, the matter will be fairly at iſſue, and we muſt, however reluctantly, abide the public judgment.

When our author deviated from the vulgar path trodden by his predeceſſors and living cotemporaries, in the ſame walk, he did not, I preſume, perceive how much he riſked in order to obtain a temporary advantage. He did not foreſee the inevitable conſequences which muſt follow ſo direct a departure from the rules hitherto preſcribed and adopted by the children of *faction* and *court proſtitution*. I mean that utter abhorrence they have at all times, and upon all occaſions betrayed towards any thing which bears the leaſt appearance of *fact* or political chronology. Our parliamentary hiſtorian, if he had duly conſidered this inſtinctive principle of *ſelf* preſervation, common to the whole body of miniſterial mercenaries, would moſt probably have contented himſelf with the degree of fame and literary renown, uſually annexed to that ſpecies of impoſition which conſiſts in hackneyed declamation, bold random aſſertions; in arguments built on premiſes *created* for the particular purpoſe, and concluſions reſulting from ſuch arguments and ſuch premiſes.

Every day's experience exhibits repeated proofs, how the ſciences, beſt known and moſt cultivated, are capable of new diſcoveries; and it is univerſally acknowledged, that the fine arts are in a progreſſive ſtate of improvement, of which the Nocturnal Remembrancer, and

patent

patent Candle-Snuffers of Mr. Pinchbeck, bear the moſt undoubted teſtimony.

To avoid however all unneceſſary digreſſions, and to come to the proper ſubject I mean to diſcuſs, I ſhall apply the obſervation to the *art* of *political lying*, and the various ſignal benefits derived from it, to thoſe who have by long ſtudy attentively meaſured and duly weighed the various uſes to which it may be employed, in eſtabliſhing a growing court faction, or in propping up one ready, from its weakneſs and corruption, to tumble to its loweſt foundation.

Swift, I think, in one of his Examiners, was the firſt of the moderns who defined the art of political lying; and, ſupporting his definition by ſeveral curious examples, reduced it into a kind of regular ſyſtem. After deſcribing ſeveral ſpecies of this art, he proceeds to point out ſome of the moſt recent refinements practiſed by its greateſt profeſſors. His words are, and they deſerve to be written in letters of Gold, " Few lies carry the *in-*
" *ventor's* mark, and the moſt *proſtitute* enemy
" to *truth* may ſpread a thouſand without
" being known for the author; beſides, as
" the vileſt writer hath his readers, ſo the
" *greateſt lyar* hath his *believers*; and it often
" happens, that if a lie be *believed* only for an
" *hour*, it hath done its work; and there is *no*
" further occaſion for it. Falſhood *flies*, and
" Truth comes *limping* after; ſo that when

" men come to be undeceived, it is *too late*; the " jeſt is over, and the tale hath had its effect."

This I take it was the ſtate of political lying in Swift's time; and, by the manner he treats that ſubject, I am inclined to believe, he meant to convey to his readers what now paſſes under the more *polite* term of a political *ſquib*; ſuch as a lying paragraph in a newspaper, or a *ſtrong aſſertion* in debate, by a cabinet miniſter, to anſwer the *purpoſe* of the *moment*. Lord Wharton was the nobleman at whom Swift pointed: how far the charge was well founded I will not pretend at this diſtance of time to determine.

But as I obſerved before, all ſciences and arts having continued to advance progreſſively towards a ſtate of improvement, it was natural to think, that the *father* of *all lies* would not neglect his diſciples, or ſuffer them to remain in the *dark*, while diſcoveries were daily making in ſtudies much leſs profitable, and which could not boaſt ſo high an antiquity.

In or about the year 1740, a moſt *promiſing genius** aroſe, full of the *ſpirit* of the *founder* of his ſect. He never curſed or tagged both ends of his propoſition with an oath, like Wharton; nor, when he carried his point, laughed publicly at thoſe whom he had deceived. He never fouled an altar, like his great

* John E—— of S——, firſt L—— of the A——y.

precurſor

precurſor and prototype; he told his lies with a very grave face, and interlarded his aſſertions with frequent affirmations of his *honeſty**.---He improved upon Wharton, however, in one particular exceedingly. If Wharton was *once* detected, there was an *end* of the *lie*; but our preſent hero, can *daily*, *weekly* and *monthly* repeat the *ſame* ſtring of *falſhoods*, which were a thouſand times before refuted, though not *literally* detected, and that with as unembarraſſed a countenance as if they had been coined, at the very moment he was ſpeaking †. This man, and *perhaps a Lord too*, is one of the firſt liars in the known world. He never tells a lie, but ſuch a one, as it is impoſſible to legally convict him of; for he tells you what he *pleaſes*, and having the means of detection in his *own* power, perſiſts in his impoſition, and *defies* you to tell how many guineas are in his ſtrong box while he *keeps* the *key* of it in his pocket.

The two greateſt geniuſes that hiſtory or living evidence in this line have uſhered to my acquaintance, I have ſlightly portrayed. Wharton, who never told the *ſame* lie after having been once clearly detected, and a great *court lord*, now living, who never affirms a falſhood, the actual proof of which, is within the compaſs or ability of his adverſaries.

* Vide all his Speeches in Parliament.

† Vide his ſpeech of the 19th of November, 1777, compared with his ſpeech of the 26th of November, 1778.

Our

Our anonymous hiſtorian ſeems to have improved upon the two noble lords, and to have ſtruck out a plan compoſed of both ingredients. Like Wharton, he has availed himſelf of the advantage derivable from a *temporary* falſhood; like his patron, he has repeated the ſame lies *verbatim*, which the noble lord has abuſed the Public with for the laſt four or five years; but unluckily the parallel does not hold, and *both lines meet*. His patron, has the key of thoſe documents, which if produced, *muſt* inſtantly bring national reſentment, execration and puniſhment upon his devoted head; while our author appeals to pretended facts, every one of which are ſuppoſed to have paſſed in the preſence of ſeveral hundred perſons. But in the words of a celebrated *quack*, "as if deſirous of immortal and univerſal fame," he has *hazarded* every thing.---He has ſtruck a bold ſtroke: his ambition was equal to the capaciouſneſs of his mind, the pliancy of his conſcience, and the great object of his purſuits.

To ſet *truth* and *common ſenſe* at defiance, in order to attain a favourite purpoſe, was bold, was enterprizing. To attack the whole body of the *whigs*, and to decry every ſpecies of government, but what is founded in the *influence* of the crown, and the *dependance* of the legiſlature, was the act of a daring and meritorious partizan; to meet oppoſition in their

their ſtrong holds of parliamentary conſultation and debate, was taking at once the bull by the horns: the worſt that could happen was to be detected. In the mean-time, he has enjoyed the ſatisfaction of *deluding* and *deceiving* the ignorant and credulous, and ſo far his plan has been I believe tolerably ſucceſsful.

But though the plan was worthy of ſuch a ſervant, and ſuch employers, now that the day of retribution is *at hand*, he will, I am perſuaded, find that his zeal out-went his judgment, and that any temporary benefit he could promiſe himſelf to derive to his party, will be found to be much more than counterbalanced by that load of *infamy* and *contempt* which muſt follow a publication, "Where the *malice* and *falſhood* of every "line, would require an anſwer, and where "the *dulneſs* and *abſurdities* will not deſerve "one."---It is a trite obſervation, that *facts* are *ſtubborn things*.---It was reaſonable to expect, that theſe facts would be *examined*, and that the *dates* would be compared. A writer may create or invent at pleaſure, but without evidence ſuch forgeries can paſs for no more than mere aſſertion, the truth of which muſt reſt ſolely upon the *credit* of an anonymous author, no very reſpectable authority at the beſt, much leſs when coming from the pen of an avowed partizan. But luckily for the diſcovery of truth and the attainment of poli-

tical

tical juſtice, our hiſtorian, like ſome other bold and improvident criminals, has made an appeal to documents, which will furniſh materials for his own conviction; and has, by this ſtretch of imprudence, become in the hands of Providence a mere inſtrument to delineate the faction, who have inſtructed and employed him, in their *native colours*.

He tells us very circumſtantially, and with all poſſible chronological correctneſs, page 5, that the fifth ſeſſion of the preſent parliament, was opened on the 26th of November, 1778, and then gives two extracts from his Majeſty's Speech, containing a complaint of the perfidy of France, in commencing hoſtilities, the *obſtinacy* of America in refuſing terms, together with a requeſt for ſupport. "Una-
" nimity, ſays he, was in the uſual form
" recommended, and ſurely no period of hiſ-
" tory more required the unanimous exer-
" tion of the whole nation."

It is evident to me, that he never read the Speech, or has purpoſely miſtated the contents; for *unanimity* was in *no* part of the Speech recommended; and I think it would have been much more decent in him, to have paſſed over in ſilence that paſſage in it which *avers*, "That the French had firſt com-
" menced hoſtilities," when the contrary was notorious. Firſt, becauſe thoſe who fabricated this falſhood, knew that ſo early as the preceding

ceding April, orders had been ſent to attack the French ſettlements in the Eaſt Indies; and ſecondly, becauſe it was a fact of public notoriety, that Admiral Keppel had in the month of June, taken two French frigates in the Bay, and afterwards for three days chaced the Breſt ſquadron, and at length forced it to a general engagement.

Another reaſon I have to believe that this writer never ſaw the King's Speech is, where he ſuppoſes, that it contains a complaint of the *obſtinacy* of America, in refuſing terms; whereas the paſſage relating to the affairs of America is, "It would have afforded me very "great ſatisfaction, to have informed you, "that the conciliatory meaſures planned by "the wiſdom and temper of Parliament, had "taken their deſired effect, and brought the "troubles in America to an happy conclu-"ſion."

What dependance there can be upon the aſſertions of any man, who, through negligence or deſign, hobbles, limps and ſtumbles in the leaſt intricate and ſmootheſt ways, may be eaſily gathered from this *ſample* of his accuracy and fidelity, in quoting and reporting facts, which hold out ſo little temptation to the diſingenuous mind, to miſtake or miſrepreſent. I ſhall forbear to make any comment upon his direct miſrepreſentation of that paſſage, which alludes to the conduct of our

admirals and generals. It is the only one which he pretends to quote in the words of the ſpeaker; to follow it, therefore, with the paſſage, as it *really* ſtands in the Speech, now before me, will, I believe, be fully ſufficient.

The Pamphleteer's quotation, within inverted commas, is, " *That* the efforts of his " majeſty had not been attended with all the " ſucceſs, which the juſtneſs of the cauſe, " and the vigour of exertions ſeemed to pro- " miſe."——The genuine paſſage runs thus: " And *although* my efforts have not been " attended with all the ſucceſs, which the " juſtice of our cauſe, and the vigour of our " exertions ſeemed to promiſe; *yet* the ex- " tenſive commerce of my ſubjects has been " *protected* in moſt of its branches, and " *large* repriſals have been made upon the " injurious aggreſſors, by the *vigilance* of my " *fleets*, and by the active and enterpriſing " ſpirit of my people."

His vehement abuſe of oppoſition, which precedes what he calls his proofs, ſhall not provoke me to retaliate. I am ready to acknowledge, that he poſſeſſes the art of ſuiting his *evidence* to his propoſitions, in a very eminent degree. He ſtates what he himſelf calls ſtrange poſitions, very ſtrange indeed; and then proceeds with his narrative.—* " The

* Page 6.

" orators,

" orators, in the lower houſe, mixed reflec-
" tions of the paſt with prophecies of future
" diſaſters. The firſt we ſhall ſubmit to the
" judgment of the reader, ſeveral of the
" latter have been already refuted by time."

" Oppoſition opened the political campaign,
" with aſſertions that had been often refuted,
" and with predictions of national diſaſters,
" which their own conduct ſeemed calculated
" to realize. As the public misfortunes may
" be deduced from the rebellion in America,
" they aſſerted *contrary* to *fact*, that hoſtilities
" had been firſt commenced by government."

I was preſent the whole of that day in the Houſe of Commons, and I heard not a ſyllable of the fact here alluded to, though no unprejudiced perſon doubts at this day, that the king's troops were the *firſt aggreſſors*. The officer commanding the party, ſent from Boſton, quitted the direct road, and advanced towards a body of militia, then aſſembled, and exerciſing under the ſanction and protection of law. Not contented with marching towards them with fixed bayonets, they commanded them to *ground* their *arms*, and *diſperſe*, and an officer, who was preſent at the time, and was afterwards made priſoner, when Mr. Horne propoſed to juſtify the charge of murder contained in his advertiſement, offered to prove that the king's troops *fired firſt*.

 " They

" They recurred, ſays our author, to their " uſual prophecies, relative to *foreign* wars, " and they went ſo far as to arm Holland, " our ancient ally, againſt this devoted king- " dom. Note (a) p. 7. Mr. T. Townſhend's " ſpeech, Nov. 26th, 1778."

I grant, that they *recurred* to their uſual prophecies, relative to foreign wars; they predicted that Spain would *join* France ſooner or later; they lamented that our miniſters, who had meanly crouched to France, had uſed the moſt arrogant and inſulting language to our ancient ally, the States of Holland, and expreſſed their apprehenſions of the conſequences of ſo *wanton* and *impolitic* a conduct. Both predictions have been *literally* fulfilled. Spain has ſince declared herſelf our avowed enemy; and Holland has *realized* the expected conſequences which were dreaded from the ill treatment ſhe received at our hands. If ſhe is not an *open* enemy, ſhe does not even wear the maſk of friendſhip; and if we ſhould longer perſiſt in inſulting her flag, contrary to the tenor of the moſt ſolemn treaties, and the eſtabliſhed law of nations, oppoſition will not be at the expence of " arming Holland" againſt this devoted kingdom, in the figurative language of the Pamphleteer, for that republic will ſave oppoſition and the nation both the trouble and expence. If I recollect Mr. T.

Townſhend's words, they did not go quite ſo far as to *arm* Holland, that gentleman only aſking, whether we were to continue armed againſt Holland, alluding to the daily captures we made of the ſhips and property of that country, againſt the faith of treaties.

" To ſow diſcontents among the militia, " they alledged, that the officers had been " ſcandalouſly neglected, Note B. Speech of " T. To———nd, 26th Nov. 1777."

I have notes of Mr. Townſhend's ſpeech now before me, and I am certain he made uſe of no *ſuch* expreſſion. He complained of the ſcandalous jobs, which had been entered into with a *favourite* contractor, Mr. Atkinſon, in order to enable him to amaſs a fortune, by ſerving the camps with black, ſour, and muſty bread, and of the impropriety of keeping raw troops ſo long on the ground, but not a word of the officers having been *ſcandalouſly* neglected, much leſs a ſyllable of that ſpurious paſſage, whence it is plain, our Author drew his information, and which was foiſted in the newſpaper accounts, or ſome tranſcript from them, and repreſents Mr. Townſhend, charging the ſpeech from the throne as containing no compliment to the militia, whereas the very contrary is evident, as his majeſty particularly commends " their *ardour*, their *public* " *ſpirit*, and *love* of *country*."

" *To*

" *To* excite *mutiny* in the army and navy, " they *aſſerted*, that government had em- " ployed no commander of an army, no ad- " miral of a fleet, whom they had not diſ- " graced, or with whom they had not quar- " relled. Note (c). Speech of Mr. F—x, " 26th, 1778. Ibid. Speech of Col. B—e."

Here we are preſented with a *fact*, accompanied with a curious logical deduction, *To excite* mutiny, &c. they (oppoſition) *aſſerted*, &c.

It will be firſt neceſſary to aſcertain the fact, which I believe needs no further proof, than a bare recital of the following circumſtances:

Generals Gage, Carleton, Burgoyne, and Howe, were ſucceſſively diſgraced; that is, actually *recalled* by adminiſtration, or at their *own* deſire. Such likewiſe was the fate of admirals Greaves, Lord Shuldham, Lord Howe, and Keppel. Having poſſeſſion of the fact, it will follow, that ſtating of it in Parliament might anſwer a *good*, as well as a *bad* purpoſe. The parties were, his majeſty's miniſters on one ſide, and the generals and admirals on the other. How ſtating a fact, on which the very *preſervation* of the ſtate might depend, in order to learn, whether the national diſaſters aroſe from the *incapacity* of miniſters, or the *want* of *ſkill* in our military and naval commanders, could be conſtrued into an attempt to excite mutiny,

is more than I can well conceive, unleſs the *bare* aſſertion of an important *truth* publicly known, is to conſtitute the crime. If, indeed, on the other hand, nothing of the kind had happened, thoſe, who had propagated ſuch a falſhood, might be charged with evil and factious deſigns: but the Pamphleteer *preſumes* the *guilt* to ariſe from the laſt aſſertion.

To excite mutiny, ſays he, they *aſſerted*, id eſt, they aſſerted, *in order* to *excite* mutiny.

" With a *contradiction* in terms, which " neither folly nor rage itſelf could juſtify, " they *averred*, that miniſtry had *ſucceeded* in " *no* inſtance, *yet* that *fortune* had been *fa-* " *vourable* in every inſtance. Speech of Mr. " Charles F—x, 26th Nov. 1778."

What a pitiful quibble, upon the words *ſucceeded* and *fortunate*. This ſurely is the laſt reſource of a poor *hunted* partiſan. Mr. Fox tells miniſters, that they had proved ſucceſsful in no inſtance, and very truly ſo. They had ordered Philadelphia to be evacuated; they had given inſtructions to attack the French fleet, &c. and they had failed in every one of their plans of attack or defence; yet *fortune* proved *favourable* in *every inſtance*, by the ſafe return of our trade fleets; by the *delays* which d'Eſtaign ſuffered in the Mediterranean, and in his way acroſs the Atlantic, having left Breſt on the 13th of April, whereas Byron did

not

not leave Plymouth till the 9th of June. The miſconduct of d'Eſtaing, in not attacking Lord Howe before his force was augmented; by the want of co-operation from the French admiral at Rhode iſland, and his ſudden departure from thence, by the miſunderſtanding between Waſhington and Lee in the Jerſies, in the engagement with Sir Henry Clinton; and in a variety of inſtances of an inferior nature. On every one of theſe occaſions, though they did not come within the deſcription of *ſucceſſes*, it would, I fancy, be doing no great violence to reaſon and common ſenſe, to call them a ſucceſſion of *eſcapes*, ſome of which might have been almoſt deciſive of the war; ſuch as the defeat or deſtruction of Sir Henry Clinton's army by famine, or the ſword; or the capture of Lord Howe's ſquadron before the reinforcement from Europe had arrived. Such a *ſeries* of *eſcapes* on one hand, and want of ſucceſs on the other, might well have ſupported the *averment* of oppoſition, without incurring a charge of "a "contradiction in terms, which neither folly "nor rage itſelf could juſtify." Familiar alluſions are always the moſt intelligible, and of courſe make their way eaſily and expeditiouſly to the underſtanding of the majority of mankind. I will ſuppoſe, that inſtead of an *addition* to Mr. Macpherſon's preſent penſion, he ſhould be proſecuted as a libeller of the conſtitution for writing the laſt pamphlet. I would

would appeal to the candour and good ſenſe of that gentleman, whether, though he had *not* ſucceeded in obtaining the expected reward of his labours, *i. e. augmentation* of his ſalary, he would not think that *fortune* had been *favourable* to him, by enabling him to eſcape from the expected conſequences of a proſecution, and ſtill ſecuring to him his former ſtipend.

" * They owned that *unanimity* was abſolutely neceſſary for the ſafety of their " country; yet with peculiar honeſty avowed, " that they would clog the wheels of govern- " ment, when it ought to be aſſiſted by every " man."

That unanimity is neceſſary in different ſituations, is a ſelf-evident propoſition; if unanimity means an *union* of *ſtrength* properly and effectually employed; but if unanimity means an *implicit* confidence in the capacity and integrity of a ſet of men, to whom the preſervation of the ſtate is unfortunately entruſted, and who have in every one inſtance, in which they have been tried, rendered it a matter of doubt, whether the uniform and perpetual blunders they have conſtantly committed, and continue to commit, originate in incapacity or treachery, or a mixture of both; ſurely in ſuch a ſtate of things, unanimity, which muſt imply *confidence*, would be an act of *political ſuicide*. Unanimity is preſumed to

* Page 7.

be the forerunner of public ſafety and ſelf-preſervation. Men of common ſenſe are not to be *ſeduced* by *mere names* or *empty ſounds*. Peter, in the celebrated tale, could never perſuade Martin and John that a *cruſt* was a ſhoulder of mutton, or that it contained very good wine. However hungry, if we are perſuaded that the food offered to us is poiſonous, it will be not eaſy to perſuade us to eat. If therefore the *name* of unanimity is not to be accompanied with its *real* and eſſential qualities, and is not likely to produce the *fruits* that aſcertain thoſe qualities, it is a *cheat* put upon the public; and he who ſuffers himſelf to be lulled into a fatal ſecurity, and to part with his confidence, or lend his ſupport, is either a paſſive *dupe*, or *active enemy* to his country.

There are, beſides, two very ſtrong reaſons againſt ſuch a ſpecies of unanimity, as that contended for by the friends and runners of a court faction, which muſt ſtrike almoſt every perſon who poſſeſſes the moſt moderate abilities. Firſt, that *no* man ought to be *truſted*, who, through folly or knavery, has once deceived you; ſecondly, becauſe you forego the *proper* employment of thoſe *means*, which God and nature, and human policy, have given to ſtates for their ſafety and protection, as well as individuals. For theſe reaſons, I think Mr. Fox with peculiar *honeſty*, as well as with his uſual candour, penetration, and ſound judgment, very properly avowed, that he would *clog* the

wheels

wheels of *government* as the only means left of removing the preſent miniſters; he would clog them out of the houſe, and *in* every thing they engaged in, while they continued to fill thoſe places which they diſgraced, and were permitted to direct the councils of that country which they were hurrying headlong to deſtruction.

The Pamphleteer goes on, and after culling expreſſions out of ſeveral paſſages in the ſpeech of Mr. Fox, in which the ſenſe is moſt ſhamefully *perverted* and tortured, in order to anſwer the hiſtorian's purpoſe, he contradicts the following propoſitions, that a war againſt America is a war againſt our own country; that the Americans are ſtill our fellow-ſubjects; that countrymen and fellow-ſubjects were better entitled to a relaxation of the rigid rules of war than foreign enemies; and charges the ſpeaker very charitably with being an abettor of rebellion, and an avowed enemy to his country. As a full proof of his hiſtorical fidelity and candour, I ſhall juſt ſtate the paſſages in Mr. Fox's ſpeech, which have been thus mangled and miſrepreſented.

" Attack France, ſaid that gentleman, for ſhe is your object, the nature of the wars is quite different; if you are ſerious in your expectations, you muſt look forward to the welfare and proſperity of that country which is again to form a part of the Britiſh empire. The people of America are allied in blood, language

and religion; a war againſt America is againſt our countrymen; you have *ſtopped* me from ſaying againſt your *fellow-ſubjects:* a war againſt France, is a war againſt a dangerous, ambitious, and inveterate enemy and rival." Mr. Fox never uſed the expreſſion of, againſt our *own* ſubjects, on the contrary, he ſtates the exception ſpecifically, by telling the houſe, "you have *ſtopped* me from ſaying your fellow-ſubjects;" nor is there a ſyllable in the whole ſpeech which imports that the Americans ought *not* to be treated as enemies, but as *peaceable* friends.

Here is a ſpecimen of proſtitute falſhood and impoſition, ſcarcely to be paralleled in the annals of miniſterial deluſion. The writer firſt frames propoſitions, and annexes a criminal intention to them, though exactly correſpondent to the language of miniſters in both houſes, an expectation of the return of the people of America to their wonted ſtate of obedience, and a political connexion and communion of intereſts between the colonies and the parent ſtate. Where the ſpeaker made uſe of any expreſſion reſembling that imputed to him, it is given in a mangled and partial quotation, and finally, after *defacing* the latter, and totally extracting the *ſpirit* from the paſſages alluded to, he has had recourſe to the powers of *invention*, in order to father upon Mr. Fox, ſentiments and opinions which never eſcaped his lips.

But

But if he has miſrepreſented and *belied* the members of oppoſition in the lower houſe, he has carried his party rancour ſtill higher againſt ſome of the members of the other aſſembly.

He has charged lord Briſtol with inſiſting, that *no* addreſs *at all* ſhould be made *, that our commerce was totally loſt, our public credit drawing to annihilation, and our fleet on the verge of ruin †. Lord Coventry, he charges with ſaying, that our armies were either *mouldered* away by death, deſertion, and ſickneſs, or reduced by loſs in battle; and the biſhop of Peterborough, with giving it as his opinion, that it would be "imprudent, if "not *impoſſible*, to perſiſt in a war againſt "France." ‡

To ſee what foundation there is for thoſe aſſertions, it will be neceſſary to refer to the text, to examine whether it be not *adulterated*, and whether the quotation be correſpondent to the general and profeſſed intention of the ſpeaker.

Lord Briſtol did *not* ſay, much leſs *inſiſt*, that *no* addreſs *at all* ſhould be made; but he gave his reaſons why he could not *agree* with *ſuch* an addreſs as that moved by the noble earl (Plymouth) and ſeconded by the noble duke (Chandois); his reaſons were, that

* Page 9. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid.

it

it was no more than an *echo* of the groſs *falſities* and fulſome commendations of the perſons who framed it, and who, by their pernicious counſels, had brought theſe once flouriſhing kingdoms nearly to ruin. The utmoſt he propoſed was to *ſuſpend* the addreſs *conditionally*, till the cauſes of our national calamities were enquired into, and the proper means deviſed for their ſpeedy and effectual removal. When his lordſhip ſpoke of the ruin of the navy, he referred to the *miſmanagement* of thoſe who had the direction of it, and its inferiority to that of the *combined* marine force of France and Spain, and demonſtrated its efficient weakneſs, on account of the *ill-treatment* of ſome of the brighteſt naval characters, and the ſpirit of faction which had been ſown and diſſeminated through every part of it, by the *firſt Lord of the Admiralty*.

Lord Coventry, is the next object of the Pamphleteer's ſpleen. His lordſhip did *not* ſay, that our armies were *mouldered*, but *mouldering*; and I believe this worthy ſcribe, will hardly controvert the authority, on which I ſhall maintain the aſſertion to be true.

General Robinſon, when firſt examined before the Committee of the Houſe of Commons, ſaid, that the whole force in America amounted to 52,000 men and a fraction; 40,874 men of whom ſerved under Sir William Howe, at the commencement of the campaign,

paign, 1777. He was aſked, whether he meant to include in this account effectives and non-effectives? With his uſual *dexterity*, he anſwered, that he *preſumed* they were *ſuch* as were *fit* to bear arms. The old gentleman was *indulged* for the preſent, but had his memory afterwards refreſhed on the third day's examination. On that day he was reminded, that in his former evidence, he repreſented the force ſerving under Sir William Howe in America, *under arms*, as amounting to 40,874; and was aſked, whether he would *abide* by that evidence? After ſome viſible *confuſion* and detail ariſing from leading queſtions put to him by the Committee, he confeſſed that the force under Sir William Howe was no more than 29,478, including that at Rhode Iſland, Staten Iſland, York Iſland, and all its vicinities. It was proved however, that the effective returns were ſcarce 27,000, by authentic official documents, which Sir William Howe read in his place. The troops under Sir Guy Carleton, were about 3000 effective, and thoſe at Hallifax and Florida 3,362, which with the 27,000 already mentioned, made between 35 and 36,000 effective men, including officers and ſtaff.

Now, if the *general return* at the commencement of the campaign, 1777, was upwards of 52,000, and in the autumn, 1778, but 35,000; I think, without any *great* violence to truth, lord Coventry was juſtified in his

his aſſertion, that ſo much of our military force as ſerved in North America, were either mouldering, *not* mouldered away by death, deſertion, and ſickneſs, or reduced by loſs in battle.

The aſſertion, I believe, was equally juſt reſpecting the force in the Weſt Indies, our Mediterranean fortreſſes, and Great Britain and Ireland. The general returns from the Weſt Indies, including the ceded iſlands, were 1,200, the effectives but 340, the general return from Dominica was 178 men, or one man to every cannon; the effective made priſoners were 41, and nearly in the ſame proportion in Granada, St. Vincent's, &c.

The general returns from Gibraltar and Minorca, including invalids and artillery, were about 10,000 men, the effective under 7000.

The general returns from Ireland were 12,000, including officers, commiſſioned and non-commiſſioned; the *effectives*, or men with muſkets on their ſhoulders, 5700: it was ſtated in debate on the Militia Bill in the Houſe of Lords, that the effective returns in Great Britain were ſhort 16,000 out of *thirty*. The fact was not directly contradicted, but doubted of by one cabinet miniſter *, and ſub-

* Lord Gower, preſident of the council ſaid, he *believed* the deficiency did not amount to 16,000, though he acknowledged it was indeed *very great*.

ſtantially

ſtantially acknowledged by the noble lord * at the head of the army.

If then the Pamphleteer does not mean to load two great cabinet miniſters with the ſame odium he has endeavoured to brand oppoſition, that of diſcloſing our weakneſs to the enemy, he will be drove to adopt "a perverſion "in terms" as abſurd as unprecedented, in order to hold out lord Coventry as a public enemy, for an aſſertion which was fully corroborated by lord Gower and lord Amherſt; nay more, by his favourite court lords, the dukes of Chandois and Beaufort, and lords Dartmouth and Townſhend, and the lord Chancellor †, *particularly* lord Townſhend, who had above a dozen times in the courſe of the ſeſſion aſſerted, that our armies in Great Britain and Ireland, were *mouldering* away, and that the garriſons of Gibraltar and Minorca were ſo weak, as in the caſe of a ſiege by ſea and land, not to be able to turn out *two* complete reliefs §. Our Pamphleteer there-

* Lord Amherſt ſaid, he approved of the bill, as the only means of procuring an immediate defence, and acknowledged that the recruiting went on *very ſlowly*; and that the corps were very far from being complete.

† Vide their ſpeeches in the debate on the Militia Bill, *& paſſim.*

§ Vide his lordſhips ſpeeches, in the courſe of the enquiry into the management of Greenwich Hoſpital, in ſeveral ſtages of that buſineſs; on lord Briſtol's motion for the removal of lord Sandwich; on lord Rockingham's motion for giving relief to Ireland; on the ſea preſs and militia bills, &c. &c.

fore ſaid the thing that was not; he baſely endeavoured to charge lord Coventry by inference with a falſhood, and by a ſide wind, without directly maintaining or controverting the truth of the aſſertion, ſtigmatized oppoſition, as the betrayers of their country, becauſe they *divulged* what? A *ſecret*, which appeared to be the current adopted *language* of *adminiſtration* itſelf, and of ſome of the moſt *favoured* of the *king's friends* during the whole ſeſſion *.

The charge againſt the biſhop of Peterborough is partly of the ſame ſize and texture, in point of intended effect, with this difference, that it is founded in direct *falſhood*. He *makes* that noble prelate ſay, that it would be *imprudent* and *impoſſible* to perſiſt in a war againſt France. Now the truth is, his lordſhip ſaid, the *very contrary*, or at leaſt did not pretend to give an opinion, one way or the other. His words, as they now lie before me, and which I *know* to be *genuine*, are, "I *preſume not*, my "lords, however, to offer *any* opinion how "far it may be prudent, or neceſſary to perſiſt "in a war againſt France." Such is the *champion* of a *prerogative* government; ſuch the ſervile tool it has choſen to revive and circulate the exploded doctrines of Brady and Filmer;

* Lord Townſhend aſpires to the above flattering and ſolid diſtinction.

and

and ſuch the diſgraceful methods taken to *miſlead* a *deluded*, and, I fear, a devoted people! I was going to give a lecture upon *public ſhame*, and public *proſtitution*: but I forgot, that my taſk is not to *reform*, but to *detect*; as it would be entirely viſionary and abſurd, to *expect* amendment, where all pretenſions to truth or honour is avowedly diſclaimed.

I obſerved early, that facts are dangerous weapons in the hands of thoſe who are only uſed to *invention*; they are like fire arms in the hands of women and children, frequently hurtful to thoſe who uſe them, as well as their friends. Towards the concluſion of that paragraph, our Pamphleteer affords a freſh proof of the juſtice of this remark, by ſaying that oppoſition in the upper houſe aſſerted, that Spain *would aſſiſt* France, and that Holland, as a commercial ſtate, would treat with America, and the whole world would join againſt us *.

Now, out of theſe three aſſertions, I contend that one of them only is ſtrictly true, namely, the firſt, which happens *not* to be one of thoſe *prophecies*, to borrow the author's quaint mode of expreſſion, "which have "been *refuted* by *time*," for Spain *has* not only aided, but *actually* combined with France, in order to effect our deſtruction.

* Pages 9 and 10. Note (u).

As to the ſecond; no ſuch expreſſion was uſed, as that Holland would *treat* with America. Conſcious of this, he did not chuſe to hazard detection by imputing the words to any *particular* ſpeaker; and as to the laſt, that the whole world would join againſt us, it was Lord Sandwich made uſe of this *extraordinary gaſconade*, and not any of the noble Lords in oppoſition*.

I have *waded* after him for ten *dull* and *lying* pages, and am now called upon to attend him in his concluſions, which I am ready to confeſs are well enough framed to deceive ſuch of his readers as previous diſpoſitions ariſing from paſſion, intereſt, indolence, and factious prejudices have prepared to ſwallow or confirm facts the moſt improbable, and concluſions the moſt abſurd and monſtrous.

" Aſſertions, ſays he, which *carried along* " with them *their own reputation*, were not " likely to make converts within, nor proſe- " lytes without doors, but what the party " could not effect by facts and arguments, " they endeavoured to accompliſh by addreſs " and intrigue †.

I moſt heartily agree with this logical *punſter*, that aſſertions, which carried along with them *their own* refutation, were not likely to make converts, if he will acknowledge the converſe of the propoſition, that aſſertions,

* Vide his Lordſhip's ſpeech on Lord Briſtol's motion.

† Page 10.

which

which carry along with them every internal evidence of truth, and every external mark of authenticity, will ever make converts among the *intelligent* and *uncorrupt* part of mankind. The facts he alludes to were, that Government employed "*no* commander, naval or military, "whom they had not quarrelled with or dis- "graced; that we had *ſucceeded* in *no* inſtance, "though *fortune* had been favourable in *every* "inſtance; that our armies had been *moulder ing* "away, and that Spain would moſt probably "join againſt us." Theſe were the aſſertions which this lover of truth pointedly obſerves, were not likely to make converts, carrying along with them their own refutation. Mark the modeſty of the man. He obſerves, with a *ſneer*, that they were not likely to make converts among a ſet of men whoſe duty he deſcribes to be to act as *dependants*, operated upon by the influence of the crown, but carefully avoids acknowledging, that *every one* of the facts were *true*, and the *predictions literally fulfilled.*

After this grand recapitulatory deduction, he ſuddenly preſents himſelf to his readers in a new character. He treats them with a ſmart inaccurate declamation, which rendered into intelligible language, amounts juſt to this: that when operations of war totally miſcarry in the hands of *different* commanders, that there muſt be a fault ſomewhere. I give him credit for the very important diſcovery;

if

if he will permit me to exemplify his propoſition, by two or three familiar alluſions to two or three very gre—at men now living.

If Mr. Wedderburne, for ſome *petulent* behaviour or *ſlip* in *practice* had not been baniſhed by a formal *arret* of the Court of Seſſion in Scotland, and proſcribed his country as a profeſſional man, England before now, for want of his *ſage* counſels and advice, might *poſſibly* have become a province of France!

If Mr. Gibbon had ſucceeded as an *author*, or had been truſted by the party on whom he obtruded himſelf, what would the American Secretary do for an Atlas to ſupport the burden of the ſtate, while is lordſhip is innocently amuſing himſelf with his two *boſom friends*, Sir John Irwin, and General Cunningham? Or,

If Mr. Macpherſon had not foregone the *profitable* and *honourable* vocation of an *highland hedge-pedagogue*, in order to muder the eyeleſs Bard and the Engliſh language, and get a penſion, what would adminiſtration do for a writer of *all work?*

But to return from this digreſſion; if they had ſeverally *miſcarried* in their purſuits, would not it be a fair concluſion that there had been an "*error* in *planning* their future "fortunes, or a *defect* in *eſtabliſhing* of them?"

This I take it is the ſum of the diſcovery which the Pamphleteer has happily made reſpecting the commanders naval and military,

but

but his reaſoning is indeed of the firſt impreſſion; "They returned without laurels, and "what was ſtill worſe, the coldneſs with which "they were received by their country had "raiſed their reſentment, as it had hurt their "pride." As government brought forward *no* accuſation againſt them, the *preſumption was*, "That they themſelves were partly to blame*".

This gentleman, I preſume, deals in *ſecret* hiſtory, as well as in that of the oppoſition. It is the firſt time I ever heard, that the admirals and generals on their return were received with coldneſs by their *country*. I have heard, that one of them was ſhut out from his ſovereign by a *cabinet* conſultation; and that the others were received coldly by *miniſters*, who are by this *junto-writer* obliquely *reprimanded* for not *commencing* the attack; for moſt certainly, with ſome induſtry, much art, and ſeaſonable *management*, a *packed* majority might have been procured, who would have conſented to ſacrifice the *lives* as well as characters of thoſe gallant commanders, to the reſentments of *ſome* ſecret adviſers, who had *ſtaked* their political reputation for the *ſucceſs* of the meaſures which they recommended; but things were not ſufficiently *ripe* for the experiment; and the part both Houſes of Parliament took reſpecting the *expected governmental* perſecution, ſhewed plainly that thoſe

* Page 10.

who

who acted with *caution* acted *wiſely*; it being extremely difficult and hazardous to *lead* or *drive* great numbers, even of *corrupt* men, to extremities, unleſs they are *let* into the *ſecret* and can *ſee their way*, which, in the caſe I allude to, would not, perhaps, be quite ſafe or adviſeable.

I touch this ſubject *tenderly*, becauſe it involves in it the *real* views and *wiſhes* of ſome of the great—eſt perſons in the nation.

The remarkable words of the author, a little altered, will however pretty much convey my meaning. " As government, *id eſt*, " the *oſtenſible* cabinet, brought forward *no* ac- " cuſation againſt the commanders, they " were given to underſtand, by way of urging " them to the performance of the *duty wiſhed*, " but *not* openly preſcribed by the *real* ad- " viſers behind the curtain, that they them- " ſelves were *partly* to *blame*."

The Pamphleteer, after giving this *ſly* rap over the knuckles to the fantoms in power, proceeds to lay before his readers a kind of epitome, or abſtract hiſtory of Sir William and Lord Howe, General Burgoyne, and Admiral Keppel, whom, in the ſpace of four pages, he has very laconically diſrobed of the leaſt degree of profeſſional merit. He takes it for granted that General Burgoyne's reſentment aroſe merely from his not being received as a *conqueror*. " *Men*, ſays our candid hiſtorian, blamed him leſs for his conduct abroad,

than

than his behaviour at home*. What would this writer do, but for his favourite antitheſis. How happily do the words *abroad* and *at home* ſtand contraſted in rhetorical counterview; and how judiciouſly has he blended the climax and anti-climax, the *leſs* and the *than*, and worked them both up into a *direct* but implied cenſure of the general's conduct at home and abroad. There is nothing like variety in polemic writing, for if facts will not ſerve the purpoſe, falſhood ſometimes may; and if neither falſhood or miſrepreſentation can be ſafely truſted, equivocal inferences and inſinuations frequently anſwer the ſame end. I am ready however to give him credit if he will only permit me to make an alteration of one word, ——to ſubſtitute the *Miniſtry* for *Men*. I ſhall then moſt ſincerely ſubſcribe to the truth of the whole paſſage.

But waving any further remarks on this gentleman's quaint expreſſions and trim periods, I ſhall proceed to take a ſhort review of his criminatory charges againſt the commanders naval and military, according to the order in which he has arranged them.

Firſt, "General Burgoyne's accepting a leave of abſence, from a *Congreſs*, who had ſhamefully evaded his own convention" †.

Secondly, "The *remembrance* of *recent* miſfortunes, and a *ſuſpicion of former errors*."

* Page 11. † Ibid.

Thirdly, " His *forgetting* that he had *left* his captive fellow-ſoldiers, whom he ought to have protected from inſult and oppreſſion, by his *preſence*; and even eluding orders given him, to return to their *aid* in their melancholly and ſevere captivity."

And laſtly, " Seeking or accepting a protection from oppoſition."

Theſe, ſays our author, *juſtified* the *court* in *adhering* to an *etiquette*, which excludes officers who have been unfortunate, from the royal preſence, till they are acquitted by a court martial.

I ſhall conſider thoſe reaſons, for proſcribing the fortunes of general Burgoyne, not in order to exculpate that gentleman, who already ſtands ſo deſervedly acquitted in the opinion of his country from the moſt diſtant ſhadow of blame or cenſure, but to ſhew, in the firſt place, the total incapacity of the miniſters who *planned* this expedition; the *criminal* neglects they were guilty of in the efforts they made to carry it into execution; and the *baſe* and *treacherous* means they reſorted to, in order to ſcreen themſelves by the *ruin* of an *innocent* man.

" His accepting a leave of abſence, &c." This is the main charge, for if he had never *come home*, he would ſtill have ſtood *high* in favour with the king's miniſters. It was *that* act alone, which, while it filled them

them with the moſt alarming apprehenſions, created in their breaſts the moſt rooted and *unquenchable* reſentments. The general's preſence *in England announced* an *appeal* to his fellow-ſubjects. The loſs of his army, brought after it immediately the French treaty and reſcript; and led, as from the fountain head, to all our ſubſequent misfortunes and preſent calamities.

Had Mr. Burgoyne *remained* at Boſton, all enquiry muſt have *ſtood ſtill*. Miniſters earneſtly wiſhed to ſuſpend all enquiry, and truſted to the *chapter* of *accidents* for their future ſecurity. One of theſe two things, they flattered themſelves, might enable them to *compound* with the nation, ſuppoſing the general to outlive a climate known to be obnoxious to his conſtitution, which was far from being the moſt ſound or robuſt; that *either* the misfortune at Saratoga might be *balanced*, and its remembrance blotted out by a proſperous campaign, or, that that fatal event might be ſwallowed up in ſome *greater calamity*.

As for the flimſy pretence of his *accepting* a leave of abſence from Congreſs, who had ſhamefully evaded his *own* convention, it is too paltry and puerile to beſtow a ſingle thought on. It was a matter of choice and prudence. His *health*, his *honour*, and future *proſpects* in life, urged him not merely to

accept, but to *apply* for leave of abſence, and if he had not ſought and accepted of it, ſince it claſhed with *no* public duty, he muſt have been totally inſenſible to every honourable and prudential motive, which is ſuppoſed to influence human actions.

" A *remembrance* of *recent* misfortunes, and a *ſuſpicion* of former errors." This is the firſt time I ever heard the word remembrance coupled with a recent misfortune; but willing to make allowances for provincial idioms, ſo far as they relate to mere phraſeology, or peculiar modes of expreſſion, I ſhould rather wiſh to let this Scotticiſm paſs unnoticed, could I collect the *ſenſe* of it from either the text or context; but as logic, *ſo far* as it is founded in *human reaſon*, is an univerſal language, I confeſs that I am much at a loſs to learn by what rule of juſtice or common ſenſe, a mere misfortune can be imputed as a crime, much leſs a *ſuſpicion* of *former errors* ariſing in the breaſt of an *intereſted* party. Surely the man is playing at croſs purpoſes, or has forgot to convey his meaning. " His" (Mr. Burgoyne's) misfortunes might " procure him " pity and regret;" and I will add, the cruel and malicious perſecutions of his enemies ought to enſure them. Now, if the author will permit me to aſſiſt him, in explaining his meaning, I think I could at once remove this ambiguity of expreſſion, and the frivolity and

abſurdity

abſurdity which it involves: let Mr. Burgoyne's *misfortunes* ſtand for his *diſagreements* with miniſters, and a *ſuſpicion* of former errors for a *pretended* ſuſpicion of recent ones, and then the public will perfectly underſtand this otherwiſe inexplicable paradox.

" His forgetting that he had left his cap-
" tive fellow-ſoldiers," &c.

The beſt anſwer to this, will be a faithful recital of ſuch part of the *evidence* given before the Committee of the Houſe of Commons, as relates to that tranſaction.

Firſt, lord Belcarras tells us *, " The offi-
" cers and ſoldiers after their arrival at Cam-
" bridge, (priſoners under the convention of
" Saratoga) were perfectly *well* ſatisfied with
" the general's *efforts* to contribute to their
" *comfort* and *redreſs* their grievances."

" They never expreſſed *any* diſſatisfaction
" at the general's *returning* to England †."

" It was the *wiſh* of the army, that the
" general *ſhould return* to Europe to *juſtify*
" not only *his own* conduct, but the conduct
" of the army he commanded ‡."

General Burgoyne at all times *ſhared* the *dangers* and *afflictions* of the army in *common*

* Vide Lord Belcarras' examination before the Committee of the Houſe of Commons appointed to enquire into the conduct of the American war.

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid.

with

with every ſoldier; as ſuch they looked upon him as their *friend*, and certainly would have received him in perſon, or any accounts of him, with *every* mark of *affection* *.

Lord Harrington. "He was not with the "army when the General (Burgoyne) came "away, but he converſed with many offi- "cers, who had come from it, and they ex- "preſſed *no* diſſatisfaction on that head, "much leſs looked on, or conſidered the ge- "neral's intentions, as inimical to them, or "that they had been deſerted by him †."

The people of England are no longer in the *dark*, for the *reaſon* which *juſtified* the *court* in adhering to the *etiquette* that excludes officers, who have been unfortunate, from the royal preſence, till they are acquitted by a court martial. The Pamphleteer has told the reaſons; General Burgoyne *offended* the miniſtry, and the *etiquette* was rigidly adhered to. Though he threw himſelf at his Majeſty's feet, he had it ſeems ſome of the *ſtubborn fullneſs* and honeſty of an *Engliſhman*; he was *too proud* to throw himſelf at the feet of his Majeſty's miniſters, and too ſpirited to father the blunders of a deteſtable junto, and a ſervile, compliant, and corrupt cabinet.

* Vid Lord Belcarras' examination.

† Vide his lordſhip's examination before the Committee of the Houſe of Commons, &c.

There

There have been inſtances however, both ſince the revolution, and in particular ſince the acceſſion of the illuſtrious Houſe of Brunſwick, in which this *etiquette* has not been rigorouſly enforced. I do not recollect having read that Lord Torrington (Herbert), was forbid the royal preſence after his defeat off Bantry on the coaſt of Ireland. There were ſeveral inſtances of a ſimilar nature, during the ſame reign, in which that *etiquette* was diſpenſed with, as well as in the next, in the diſaſters which happened to Lord Galway and General Stanhope in Spain. The affair at Carthagena, was an *unfortunate* one; ſo were the battles of Fontenoy, Racoux, and la Felt. Colonel (now General) Grant was defeated at Fort du Queſne, and General Murray, the preſent governor at Quebec, during the late war, both with great ſlaughter. General Blakeney was created a peer, and Knight of the Bath, though he rendered himſelf and a numerous veteran well-appointed garriſon priſoners at Fort St. Phillips. Sir John Cope was defeated at Preſton Pans, and General Hawley at Falkirk, during the late rebellion in Scotland; and yet I do not remember that *any one* of them were forbid the royal preſence. Even General Bligh, who received ſo fatal a defeat at St. Cas, in which above 1800 of the very flower of the Britiſh army, guards, grenadiers, &c.

&c. were killed, wounded or made priſoners, was *not* prevented a *ſight* of his ſovereign, though the cold manner he was received by his late Majeſty, induced him to reſign his regiment, and rank in the army: but to return to the *true cauſe* of Mr. Burgoyne's diſgrace; a plan was formed by *ſome body*, or *ſome perſons*, and *fathered* by the king's miniſters, for conquering the whole continent of North America, by operations down Hudſon's river. Theſe tools of a *traiterous junto* promiſed more than they could perform, and adopted the plan upon *truſt*. The force propoſed was *inadequate*, and the force collected was ſhort of what was propoſed. The journal of the operations, formed part of the amuſements of the ſummer evenings at K—, and what with the *abſurdity* of the plan itſelf, and the total *incapacity* of the creatures who were employed to breathe a ſoul into it, the whole ſcheme miſcarried. Of all the fools, the *obſtinate* blockhead, ſupported by an union of *will* and *power*, is the moſt incorrigible and irreclaimable. *Peremptory* orders were given to Mr. Burgoyne to proceed to Albany, and the *elements* and *events* of *war* were put *under* his *command*. If they were *mutinous*, it was not the fault of Lord George Germaine, his colleagues in office, or thoſe who ſet them to work, it was the general's, who neglected to keep up a *ſtrict diſcipline*. He likewiſe diſobliged

the

the ſavages, and of courſe tacitly affronted* and inſulted his *pious* employers.

That this was the tenor of General Burgoyne's orders, will not, I preſume, be denied by our ingenious hiſtorian, when I repeat the following teſtimony; I will not ſay after an enemy, or an open adverſary, but from a very reſpectable officer, who can hardly be ſuſpected, from many well known circumſtances, to entertain any great *partiality* for the unfortunate general. The perſon I allude to is Sir Guy Carleton, who after many endeavours to avoid giving a direct anſwer, as to his opinion relative to the peremptorineſs of Lord Germaine's orders to Mr. Burgoyne to proceed to Albany, gave at length the following reply:

"I ſhould have certainly endeavoured to "obey them, (the orders from the Secretary "of State) to the utmoſt of my power: If I "might be indulged, I would beg leave to "ſay, that I did not mean to evade any "queſtion. I meant to anſwer directly; yet

* Lord Harrington on his examination ſaid, "he had been preſent at ſeveral councils held between the General and Indian Chiefs, in which the General *forbid* their ſcalping. The General *threatened* the murderer of Miſs M'Rea with death, and his Lordſhip was afraid he would have carried his threat into execution. Nothing, he believed, but motives of policy prevented him. The Indians, when thus reſtrained, deſired to return home; ſome of them quitted the army, and one chief cauſe of their deſertion was, becauſe they were not permitted to indulge themſelves in their habits of plunder, bloody enormities, and cruel exceſſes."

" queſtions may be put to me of ſo delicate " a nature, and perhaps no man in the " world is in a more delicate ſituation in " reſpect to the preſent caſe in queſtion, and " the buſineſs of the committee, than I am. " When ſuch queſtions are put to me, I ſhall " pray the indulgence of the committee to " be excuſed anſwering, but I will not evade " them. As I now underſtand the meaning " of the right honourable member (Colonel " Barre) in the former queſtions to be, whe- " ther I ſhould have taken upon me to *ſuper-* " *cede the King's orders*, ſuppoſing I knew of " any *unſurmountable* difficulties in the way, " ſuch as that I had information of twenty " thouſand men at Ticonderago before Ge- " neral Burgoyne left the province of Ca- " nada, I ſhould have told General Burgoyne " my information, or if I was to proceed " myſelf, I ſhould think myſelf *bound* to ad- " vance towards Albany in *obedience* to my " inſtructions, be the event what it might, " ſo far as there remained the *moſt diſtant* " proſpect of ſucceſs or co-operation *.

One favourite object of this Pamphleteer is, I perceive, the heaping the moſt ſhameful and unqualified abuſe upon that very gallant and able officer Sir William Howe. The language he conveys it in, is ſuch as could only

*Vide Sir Guy Carleton's examination before the Committee of the Houſe of Commons, appointed to enquire into the conduct of the American war.

fall

fall from a perſon ſeemingly unacquainted with the *right end* of a *firelock*.

" Poſſeſſed, ſays he, of the common *rou-*
" *tine* of military knowledge, he ſeems to be
" capable of ſecuring from defeat ſuch troops
" as he led againſt ſuch an enemy*." Here the Engliſh reader will probably be inclined to believe, that this ſtrange metamorphoſis of the words of his native language, cloathed in a foreign idiom, is the manufacture of a Scotch univerſity, or is meant to conceal the real deſign of the author, under expreſſions apparently ambiguous. Such as " A *routine* of *military knowledge*, ſeems to have been *capable* of *ſecuring* from defeat." What does the filthy dreamer mean? Does he reſt his aſſertion on facts? Has Sir William Howe obtained *no victory*, or ſecured his troops only from *defeat?* Or is the Pamphleteer as ignorant of the American war as of the King's Speech, or that of the Biſhop of Peterborough? Was the attack of Bunker's-Hill, the defeat of the Rebels at Long-Iſland; the beating back the Rebels at the White-Plains, the repulſe near Bound-Brook, and the victories at the Brandywine and German Town, only ſo many inſtances of his *ſecuring* his troops from *defeat?* Thus does our Hiſtorian mould his concluſions as well as his facts at pleaſure: victories, with *him*, amount only to *ſecurities*

* Page 12.

from *defeat*. When he cannot draw concluſions he *inſinuates* whatever he would wiſh to impreſs on his readers, and when theſe two favorite weapons fall out of his hand, or cannot be employed to any effectual purpoſe, he *flies* to the *forlorn hope*, a round bare faced unqualified falſhood.

But however diſguſting the taſk may be I have undertaken, it is neceſſary that I ſhould purſue this writer through all his windings and turnings.

In the ſame paragraph †, he *ſuppoſes*, though he argues upon it as a fact *proved* according to all the formalities of legal evidence, that Sir William Howe, " Senſible of his incapacity " in the great requiſites of a general, choſe " to prevent any reverſe of fortune by retiring " from the command of the army. His re- " treat was aſcribed to his having *loſt* the " confidence of men in power; the fact " might be true, but it was not ſufficient to " ſatisfy the people."

The fact was true, that he had loſt the confidence of men in power. Lord Germaine acknowledged ‡ it in the Houſe of Commons in debate, and there was not a perſon of any information in London or New York, who did not know that the noble lord laſt mentioned, began to cabal and intrigue

† Page 12.

‡ Vide Lord George Germaine's ſpeech on Col. Barre's motion, May 3.

againſt

againſt the general with the American refugees, and ſome officers who returned from New-York, whoſe names I *forbear* to *mention*, ſo early as the ſpring, 1777. Yet our Author has the modeſty to tell his readers, that he was received with *kindneſs* by his *Sovereign*, and *attention* by the *Miniſtry*. One word more only was wanting, which would have rendered this paſſage intelligible. I mean, adding the word *ſeeming* kindneſs and attention, &c. but I preſume he declined it for the ſake of uniformity, or his heart revolted at the idea of *truth* in *any* form or on any occaſion.

" He perceived, ſays our Author, that he " was vaniſhing faſt from the favour of the " nation. In the ſpace of a few months he " found himſelf of as little account in the " eſtimation of the public as any of his own " commiſſaries, and to cover his own reputation he cloſed eagerly with oppoſition, as " they promiſed him their hearty aſſiſtance " in a parliamentary enquiry *.

I defy any of the dreamers, whifflers, and itinerant coffee-houſe tools, with all their dulneſs and impudence, were they to commence authors, to comprize ſo much nonſenſe and abſurdity within ſo narrow a compaſs.

Within the ſpace of a few lines, he has told us, " That Sir William Howe *might* have

* Page 12.

loſt

loſt the confidence of men in power, but that he was received by them with attention, that the nation was not pleaſed with his ſervices, though he was vaniſhing faſt from its memory, and was become of as little eſtimation as one of his own commiſſaries; that ſenſible of his own *incapacity*, he cloſed eagerly with oppoſition, in order to have his *conduct* enquired into and *proofs* brought before Parliament, that the utmoſt pretenſion of ſkill in his profeſſion, was a routine of military knowledge, which rendered him capable of *ſecuring* his troops from defeat." This laſt quality, though not intended as a compliment by the bye, is ſuch a one, as neither Marlborough, Turenne, nor Prince Eugene were ever entitled to.

But now, that the public are maſters of this gentleman's reaſoning and conjectures, I truſt I may be indulged with a few *facts*, which will enable the nation to form a true judgment between the parties.

The plan of operations by the Lakes and Hudſon's River was the *ſecondary* object of the firſt *intended* effective campaign in America, that of 1776. A ſufficient force was promiſed to Sir Guy Carleton to open the campaign early on the ſide of Canada. The American miniſter b—ke his word. General Phillips was ſent out with a train of artillery, which if the whole army had entirely conſiſted of matroſſes, would have been hardly numerous enough to execute that part of the ſervice. Boats and craft

were

were ſent from hence to expedite the operations of the army by way of the lakes, which were of no uſe, as neither artificers were ſent nor inſtructions given how to put them together, ſo as to be rendered of any ſervice. Sir Guy Carleton, too weak for effective operations, after the expedition had put the nation to a moſt enormous expence, was obliged to return to Montreal, abandon the expedition, and leave Crown Point unoccupied. But attend to the wiſdom of the Britiſh cabinet; ſuppoſing that the Canada army had met with ſucceſs, had taken Ticonderago, and reached Albany; with what force was it to operate? With Sir William Howe then at Hallifax, waiting for reinforcements from Great Britain, with the Britiſh and German troops then on their *paſſage*, and a fleet of men of war and frigates no more than mid-way acroſs the Atlantic. Blunders are ſometimes fortunate; they are often productive of *eſcapes*, as well as *defeats*; for had Sir Guy Carleton attacked Ticonderago and taken it, and afterwards penetrated into the enemies country, he would moſt probably have met with the fate of General Burgoyne.

Let us now turn to the other object, and the principal one, that of landing at New York, taking poſſeſſion of that and the other iſlands in its vicinity, and ſending a force up the North River, to co-operate with Sir Guy Carleton.

Sir

Sir William Howe is desired to evacuate* Boston, where he had been cooped up for several months, and if he thought his force not equal to the subduing of New-York, he is desired to repair to Hallifax, until he should be in force to attack the middle colonies, and favour the operations on the side of Canada. He waits at Hallifax, till goaded by disappointment and delay, he proceeds to Staten Island, where he arrived on the 29th of June. The delay at Hallifax is here continued; his brother, he was informed, was to leave England early in March. None of the reinforcements of which his grand army was to be chiefly constituted had yet arrived; nor was there the least account of them. He has no opportunity of hearing from general Carleton, nor if he had, could it have answered any purpose, but to add to his vexation, disappointment and chagrin. He had the fullest assurance from lord George Germaine, that he would enable him to take the field in the *month* of *May*, or *beginning* of June. How was this promise performed? The general, in anxious and momentary expectation that Commodore Hotham with the first embarkation of troops would arrive, that he might be enabled to take the field, found himself most cruelly disappointed. The commodore did not make

* Vide the letters from Lord George Germaine; his Majesty's approbation of that measure, and his lordship's particular sentiments thereon, in the cabinet correspondence.

his

his appearance till the month of Auguſt was conſiderably advanced. The American miniſter forgot that camp equipage, ſuch as tents, kettles, &c. formed any part of the neceſſaries of an army, in the progreſs of a campaign, which muſt from its nature, various objects, and very extenſive operations, be puſhed in a very ſevere and boiſterous climate, far in the winter. As ſoon as the troops were a little refreſhed from the fatigues of a tedious and diſagreeable voyage of upwards of 3000 miles, the proper diſpoſitions were made, and meaſures taken to commence hoſtilities, and the troops landed on Long Iſland, on the 22d of Auguſt, little more than three weeks before the commander in chief would have thought it his duty, but for the ſhameful diſappointments and delays now enumerated, to give orders to the proper officers to *provide winter quarters.*

I ſhall not pretend to enumerate the almoſt inſurmountable difficulties the general had to contend with. I do not mean inſurmountable upon any other account but a *want* of *time.* His ſkill, valour and perſeverance, the almoſt certain fore-runners of ſucceſs, ſupplied every want, and counterbalanced diſappointments from time, which would have been enough to break the ſpirit, and depreſs and diſtract any other man. I ſhall not enter into the particulars of the campaign, becauſe the petty cavils, inſidious inſinuations, and the male-

volent ill-founded cenſures thrown upon his military conduct, will be beſt refuted in another place; I mean, when I come to obſerve on the *aſſaſſinate* evidence *fabricated in London*, in order to rob him of his perſonal honour and profeſſional reputation.

Such was the *cabinet* plan of 1776, and ſuch the execution of it, ſo far as it depended on the aſſurances and good faith of miniſters. From the 22d of October, 1775, to the 26th of March, the general never received a ſcrap of paper from either Lord Dartmouth or Lord George Germaine; nay, ſo late as the 21ſt of the latter month, his diſpatch was addreſſed to the *former*; and if fortune had not particularly favoured him, he and his whole army might have been reduced by famine, or be compelled to engage an enemy, ſtrongly poſted and entrenched, with almoſt a certain proſpect of ruin and defeat. Compelled to fly from Boſton, having but a *very few days* proviſions in ſtore, he waits to no effect for the promiſed ſuccours from England, for ſix tedious weeks, and then repairs to Staten Iſland, where five weeks more are neceſſarily waſted, in the ſame manner, before part of the troops only arrive from Great Britain, and even then, finds himſelf compelled to commence operations with a force by no means *adequate* to the ſeveral great objects of his command; ſo that he was left to his fate, no matter

ter whether he met it from famine or the ſword, in Boſton for *nine months*, without ſtores, proviſions, reinforcements, or ſo much as a ſingle office-letter for his government; and after, what in the opinion of men of the firſt character for military knowledge, was deemed a *miraculous eſcape*, he is committed to the mercy of the elements, to buffet and be buffeted by the waves from Boſton to Nantaſket Road, from Nantaſket to Hallifax, and from Hallifax to Staten Iſland, for almoſt *four months*, without having *one* of the pompous promiſes of the American ſecretary fulfilled. Not a man, not a tranſport, nor a ſtore ſhip; not a Briton or a German, or a ſhip of the line, had, during this anxious and critical period, made their appearance; every one of which Lord George Germaine repeatedly promiſed ſhould have been with the general in time, to enable him to open the grand campaign in the month of M—y, or in the *beginning* of June.

Having, in the courſe of the review of the campaign, 1776, made many *aſſertions*, and *ſtated* a variety of intereſting *facts*, and having no right as an *anonymous* writer to expect, that either one or the other can be entitled to any degree of credit, farther than ſuch of them as command belief from their notoriety, or have never been controverted, or come authenticated by proofs, I look upon myſelf bound to endeavour to ſtamp them with the *ſeal* of

official authority, as they lie in Lord George Germaine's correſpondence, delivered by his private ſecretary (Mr. De Grey) in at the table of the Houſe of Commons, as a correct and faithful copy.

Sir William Howe condemns the expedition to the ſouthward to Cape Fear and South Carolina; obſerves that the plan was *not* communicated to him, and adds that the means by which he obtained any intimation of it, was by private letters received at Boſton. He *predicts* its bad ſucceſs.*

" The drains drawn to the ſouthward of " Quebec and Hallifax, will reduce the ex- " pected ſtrength for the campaign ſo conſi- " derably, that if a reſpectable force does not " arrive *early* in the ſpring, *another* defenſive " campaign, I conclude, will be the conſe- " quence. The ill conſequences that muſt " ariſe from another defenſive campaign, are " not to be pointed out to your lordſhip †."

" I beg leave to remark, the laſt commands " I had the honour to receive from your " lordſhip are dated the 22d of October ‡."

State of proviſions in Boſton on the 4th of March. Beef and pork 17 days, flour 63 days, bread 16 days, butter and cheeſe 12 days.

* Letter to the ſecretary of ſtate, dated from Boſton, 16th January, 1776. † Ibid.

‡ His letter to the ſame, dated 21ſt March, 1776.

The

The troops remained afterwards 11 days, namely, to the 17th. The tranſport tonnage for the removal of the troops, was no more than 22,000, inſtead of what was neceſſary, which was 31,000 tons *.

Lord George Germoine. "I ſhall enable you to take the field with an army of 20,000 men.

"The additional quantity of tonnage of ſhipping, which you ſtate to be wanting for the entire evacuation of Boſton, is very large; but it will be in a great meaſure, if not altogether, ſupplied by the *ſtore ſhips* already *gone out* †.

"As to the ſupply of proviſions, &c. ſtated in the returns that *belongs* to the *treaſury* ‡.

"Independent of the efforts we ſhall make early to relieve Quebec, I hope that by the *firſt* of *March*, we ſhall be able to ſend general Carleton 10,000 men §."

Sir William Howe. "If the ſuccours do not arrive *in time* from Europe, it is moſt likely that the rebels will have recourſe to ſtrong entrenched ſituations, in order to *ſpin out* the campaign, if poſſible, without expoſing themſelves to any deciſive ſtroke ||.

* His Lordſhip's letter to Sir William Howe, 18 Nov. 1773.

† Ibid. 5th January, 1776. ‡ Ibid.

§ Ibid. || His letter, April 25th, 1776.

"I

" I *tremble* when I think of our *preſent ſtate* of " proviſions, having now meat for no more " than *thirteen* days, with the poſſibility of " ſupplies not arriving *.

" A private trader from Waterford arrived " this morning, with as much beef and pork " as will ſupply the army *ſix days* †."

Lord Germaine. " We ſhould endeavour " as early as poſſible, to have a force in Ca- " nada ready to commence its operations as " ſoon as the ſeaſon will permit ‡.

" The effect of theſe orders will be, that " the troops will join you, ſo that you may " be able to *open* the *campaign* in the *Month* " of *May*, or *beginning* of the month of " *June* §.

" There is good ground to hope that the " army (from Canada) will be able to advance " into the other colonies by the paſſage of the " lakes; and accordingly every proper prepa- " ration has been made here that can give fa- " cility to ſuch a plan ||."

Sir William Howe. " I have ſuffered the " *moſt ſenſible mortifications* by being kept *ſo* " *long* at this place, but the late arrivals of " the proviſion ſhips, have made an earlier " removal impracticable **.

* His letter of the 7th of May, 1776. † Ibid.
‡ His Lordſhip's letter, Feb. 7. § Ibid.
|| His Lordſhip's letter of the 28th March.
** His letter of the 7th of June.

Sir

Sir William Howe (in his letter of the 8th of July from Staten Iſland) tells Lord Germain: " I wait here the arrival of the Eng-
" liſh fleet, or the arrival of General Clinton.
" I beg leave to repreſent to your lordſhip,
" the *want* of camp equipage at this time,
" which may continue during this rebellion,
" unleſs ſent the *year before* it is to be uſed,
" alſo the neceſſity of an *early* ſupply of wool-
" lens, linen, and ſhoes."

Lord George Germaine. " Your not having
" received ſupplies, would have been f—l
" but for the ſtep you very prudently took
" of withdrawing from the town of Boſton;
" which, under the circumſtances you have
" ſtated, is a meaſure *very much* approved of
" by the king, and in the execution of which
" you have given the fulleſt proof of his
" majeſty's wiſdom and diſcernment in the
" choice of ſo *able* and *brave* an officer to
" command in America. The king had en-
" tertained a well grounded hope, that an
" early and effectual impreſſion would have
" been made either in New-England or New-
" York, and that the ſupplies which had
" been ſent out, would have enabled you to
" have maintained yourſelf at Boſton, *till* a
" a force was *collected* adequate to ſome deci-
" ſive blow. The *failure* of thoſe ſupplies
" is a very *unfortunate event* †.

† Lord George Germaine's letter, 3d May, 1776.

Sir

Sir William Howe. " Your lordſhip will " obſerve by the returns, that we are in force " ſufficient to enter upon offenſive operations, " but I am *detained* for the *want* of camp " equipage, particularly *kettles* and *cantines*, ſo " eſſential in the field, and without which " too much is to be apprehended on the ſcore " of health."

" On the 12th, the two fleets under convoy " of Commodore Hotham and the Repulſe, " arrived off this harbour. The camp equi- " page is alſo come, and *no* time will be loſt " in proceeding on the operations of the cam- " paign †."

Here commences an account of the military operations, with the landing of the troops on Long-Iſland, which may be ſummed up in almoſt a ſingle line. That inſtead of taking the field in the latter end of May, or the beginning of June, the operations were delayed *full* three months, through the neglect or incapacity of miniſters; that during thoſe three months the rebels had an opportunity of augmenting and diſciplining their troops, raiſing defences, conſtructing batteries, &c. by which means the *reſiſtance* they made was much more formidable and vigorous; that after they had been repeatedly drove out of

† Sir William Howe's letter, dated Staten Iſland, Auguſt 15, 1776.

their

their ſtrong holds, native poſts, and commanding ſituations, the days became ſo ſhort, the climate ſo ſevere, and the weather ſo extremely unfavourable to operations in the field, together with the inceſſant fatigues of night as well as day-ſervice in an enemy's country, bad roads, land floods, woods, moraſſes and defiles, formed ſuch a concurrence of cauſes, and created ſuch uncommon difficulties, that every proſpect of ſucceſs, I mean of *deciſive ſucceſs*, was *loſt* for ever to this country. The campaign within land, I mean beyond York-Iſland, did not properly commence till the month of October, inſtead of commencing early in July. The reſiſtance was conſequenty much *greater*, the *impreſſions* leſs deciſive. The Britiſh cabinet, it was therefore evident, by their ignorance or want of union, or ſome other cauſe as yet unrevealed, more effectually *ſerved* our rebellious colonies in America, than in the ſummer, 1776, it was in the power of not only the Houſe of Bourbon, but that of all Europe united to accompliſh.

I have treated this part of my ſubject more in detail than the general ſcheme of theſe obſervations may ſeem to demand; but I was induced to do it for the following reaſons: firſt, becauſe I never yet heard the *real* cauſes of the miſcarriage of the American war properly ſtated within or without doors. The firſt ſtages of this fatal buſineſs, were con-

ducted in a *languid irreſolute* manner. *Loud empty* threats, *feminine* reſentments, *loſty* ſounds, and *unmeaning* expreſſions, were the leading features which marked this monſter of mo—ck deſpotiſm, miniſterial puſillanimity, and radical weakneſs.

While we were *proſcribing* the *lives* and *fortunes* of *three millions* of people, we committed the honour, dignity, and moſt eſſential intereſts of the Britiſh empire to the protection of an handful of undiſciplined troops. After the two bruſhes at Lexington and Bunker's-Hill, where, if our troops and generals "were "not diſgraced they gained no laurels," we fell a curſing like a very drab. Addreſſes to the throne from parliament, declaring our then ſubjects in rebellion, and denouncing the moſt exemplary chaſtiſement, were the firſt objects of terror held out to induce the colonies to ſubmit, not to an *arbitration* of their *rights* upon the ſolid foundation of the Britiſh conſtitution, but upon *preſcribed* terms of *unconditional* ſubmiſſion. An act of the legiſlature, avowing this doctrine in its fulleſt and moſt unqualified extent, ſtill ſtands unrepealed upon our ſtatute books. The ſame language was re-echoed from almoſt every corner of the united kingdom. *Seventy thouſand men* were voted upon *paper* to enforce thoſe doctrines of policy and legiſlation. I ſpeak here *ad hominum* to the men who maintained thoſe doctrines

trines in argument, in cabinet, and parliament, on the juſtice of which I do not deem myſelf bound to give an opinion; meaning no more than to point out the direct *repugnancy* between their *conduct* and *profeſſions*. Miniſters declare the coloniſts rebels; they ſhut up their ports and proſcribe their trade, commerce, and property; they refuſe ſo much as to hear of any conceſſion whatever, ſhort of laying down their arms and ſubmitting; notwithſtanding which they neglected to take a ſingle *effective* ſtep, either to ſuppreſs the rebellion, or *ſupport* and *protect* the *few* troops they had at Boſton, for upwards of twelve months.

The action at Bunker's-Hill, happened on the 17th of June, and unleſs the *ſkeleton* of a few regiments, and a detachment of marines the whole not amounting to 4000 men; I do not recollect that any reinforcement, however trifling, reached the army under Sir William Howe till the month of July following, a period of full eleven months. But from the latter end of Auguſt, 1775, to the month of July, *not a ſingle man.*

It is not only on account of being *dilatory* and *neglectful* that miniſters are deſerving of cenſure, but it is that they had *no plan*. It was that circumſtance chiefly which proclaimed their total incapacity, I mean, after the war had been determined on, the men voted, the

prohibitory law paſſed, and treaties for the levy of a conſiderable number of Germans finally agreed upon and ratified by the contracting parties.

Were it worth while, I could give numerous inſtances to prove the truth of this aſſertion. Sir Guy Carleton was deſired to march, he *knew not whither*, nor for *what* poſſible purpoſe. Impreſſions were to be made on the ſouthern provinces, particularly on Virginia and South Carolina. A few ſickly non effective regiments, more than one half compoſed of raw recruits, with the aid of the neighbouring Indians and ſlaves within thoſe provinces, were to enact *wonders*. One time the *ſeizing* of Rhode Iſland was the *favourite* object; the *next* diſpatch recommended New York, or the coaſts of New England. Operations u—p a—d down the North, or Hudſon's River, was a theme miniſters frequently indulged themſelves with rapture on. In ſhort, there was ſcarcely a river, bay, or creek, from Penſacola to Hallifax, which did not at different times preſent to them the means of invaſion, incurſion, and ultimate conqueſt. But the worſt of this *ridiculous* levity, abſurdity and contradiction was, that as they had *no* plan of their own, neither would they permit others to help them to one. They avoided carefully *all* communication with profeſſional men at *home*, and they were determined, that the perſon

perſon whom they thought proper to employ ſhould have n—o w—ill of his own, not even the very power and patronage uſually annexed to his command. There is ſcarcely one letter in the whole correſpondence, which does not exhibit the ſtrongeſt indications, that the *nominal* commander in chief, acted as a kind of adjutant general to a *military* convention aſſembled in cabinet.

More than one half of the miniſterial part of the correſpondence is entirely taken up with the *diſtribution* of the regiments, batallions, and corps; nay, even companies; the ranks and gradations of ſubaltern officers; in fine, this *ſearching active* ſpirit of *military arrangement*, pervades the whole of the diſpatches, and rel——ieves the commander in chief, of a great deal of trouble, and of courſe of a great deal of influence and authority; for it ſtrikes me, though no military man, that when rank and preferment can be obtained only through another channel, and not through that of the commander in chief, that thoſe qualifications, whether perſonal or profeſſional, will be ſtudiouſly cultivated, that lead more directly and with greateſt certainty, to military *diſtinctions* and *rewards*.

After this long diſcuſſion, of, I muſt confeſs, a very complex and intricate ſubject, which I have endeavoured to ſimplify, ſo far as it is connected with the deſign of theſe ob-

obſervations,

ſervations, I return once more to ſalute my able antagoniſt, the worthy parliamentary hiſtorian.

I think I left him in the act of abuſing the fantoms of the cabinet, for daring to place a man *obnoxious* to the *junto*, at the head of the weſtern ſquadron. Our author is now and then, in the language of the bench, *well enough*. He is not in earneſt, he and I are equally perſuaded that Admiral Keppel was known to be a whig, and is repreſented as a man of *oppoſing* principles; but what of that? I venture to gueſs that Lord Sandwich and his ſovereign lords the junto, might have *ſelected* him for the command, upon *that* very account. This conduct mig—ht have its foundation in liberal ſentiments. I deny that; though I heartily coincide with the other part of the ſentence, that "It has operated like weakneſs," and for *this* reaſon, that *cunning* men are *ſhort* ſighted, and ſeldom ſee further than the next turning of their crooked policy. Admiral Keppel, though put on the forlorn hope, *eſcaped* with his life, and what was infinitely dearer to him than life, his honour. Perhaps Lord Sandwich, as well as his maſters, imagined, that the events of war are uncertain, and playing the double game is always the ſureſt. For inſtance, his lordſhip's employers might have imagined, if any diſaſter had befallen the weſtern ſquadron,

that

that while they *enſured* impunity to themſelves, they would have the pleaſure of *roaſting* a *whig* admiral, and a man of oppoſing principles.

After, I preſume, deep ſtudy and great attention having penetrated the abyſs of things, and diſcovered " that few officers are ſuch ſturdy moraliſts, as to exclude political prejudices from the line of their duty," the meaning of which I am at a loſs even to gueſs at. Our author takes up the proper line of his own duty, that is, not being ſo ſturdy a moraliſt, as to admit political prejudices, unleſs they promiſe to advance his cauſe, he therefore gives a pretty biographical hiſtorical narrative of the grand fleet, and its operations. Mr. Keppel, he ſays, met the enemy, and a *running fight rather* than an engagement enſued. This may be all ſound logic and good Engliſh at Aberdeen or St. Andrews, but I doubt its ever paſſing current at this ſide of the Tweed. Two fleets meeting on *contrary* tacks or *paſſing* each other, and ſuſtaining a conflict of full three hours, may, for aught I know, be a very proper term for ſuch a mode of engaging in the northern part of this kingdom; but I believe by a *running* fight, in the neighbourhood of the Thames and Medway, is underſtood, when one fleet or army is *retreating* or *flying* from the other, and the former every now and then, waiting for an advantage, makes a ſtand, and defends itſelf in order to facilitate its eſcape.

But

But, I do not mean to differ with my antagoniſt, about the mere mode in which he has thought fit to expreſs himſelf. Slovens are often men of talents and ſound underſtanding, and mens abilities are not to be judged of by their habit or demeanour.

I ſhall not follow our author in his hiſtory of the *riſe* and *progreſs* of the difference of opinion, between Mr. Keppel and Sir Hugh Palliſer, all I wiſh to ſay on this part of his performance is, that I think the indignities and ſlights, the *ingratitude* of friends, and the perſecution of foes, were *nothing* in compariſon to the *treatment* poor Sir Hugh has met with from this avowed *advocate*. He obſerves, page 15, that from being the *accuſed*, he became the *accuſer*, and this ſtep turned the ſcale of opinion in Mr. Keppel's favour.

After this cruel *ſtab* aimed at a *fallen* man; fallen *never* to riſe again! I might ſtand excuſed, had I remained totally ſilent on the ſubject; but as I have frequently remarked in the courſe of theſe obſervations, when our author ever attempts to deal in *fact* or *ſpecification*, he is eternally liable to fall into error. In order to give Sir Hugh Palliſer a *plaiſter* for the cruel wound which he had juſt before inflicted upon him, he tells us,

In *vain* had Sir Hugh Palliſer declared in the moſt *ſolemn* and public manner, that he had not communicated his deſign (of accuſing

Mr.

Mr. Keppel) to *any* man. In vain did men in office affirm on the *faith* of *gentlemen*, that they knew *nothing* of the accuſation till it was officially delivered to the admiralty; but no credit was to be given to a *tory* adminiſtration *. Now what credit gentlemen, no matter whether *whigs* or *tories* deſerve, who expreſsly *contradict* themſelves, reſpecting the *ſame* fact, muſt be left to the general underſtanding of mankind; for I can affirm upon *oath*, were it neceſſary, that I *heard* Lord Sandwich *ſolemnly* affirm on the *faith* of a *gentleman*, that he was totally unacquainted with Sir Hugh Palliſer's intentions *of accuſing* Mr. Keppel, till in his official capacity he received the accuſation at the Admiralty Board †; and I heard the *ſame* Lord Sandwich afterwards affirm upon the *faith* of a *gentleman*, that he *adviſed* Sir Hugh Palliſer *not* to make any charge againſt his Commander in Chief, and ſtated his reaſons to the worthy baronet at the time, why he thought the preferring ſuch an accuſation, would be *extremely hurtful* and detrimental to the ſervice, and of courſe injurious to the nation ‡.

* Page 16.

† Vide his lordſhip's ſpeech on the Bill for trying Admiral Keppel on ſhore, in anſwer to ſome ſtrong inſinuations thrown out againſt him by the Duke of Richmond, and Bolton, and Lord Shelburne, on the 18th of Dec. 1778.

‡ Vide his ſpeech on the 3d of April, 1779, in anſwer to the Duke of Richmond, on the examination of Mr. Jack-

I ſhall paſs over all the ſcurrilities and Billingſgate oratory, that fill the five ſucceeding pages, in which he ſuppoſes, that *ſome* of the firſt perſons in the kingdom diſguiſed themſelves as porters, and entered into a *conſpiracy* with the tallow-chandlers and glaziers of London and Weſtminſter, to promote their reſpective intereſts, a *conſumption* of *candles*, the *demolition* of *window glaſs*, and the *overthrow* of the *miniſtry*!!!

There is a certain ſtandard or excellence of ſtile, and elegance of expreſſion, which every writer and ſpeaker more or leſs affects, and which for diſtinction ſake, I chuſe to call *technical*. The old proverb ſays, "a ſhoemaker to his laſt, a butcher to his marrowbones and cleavers, &c." Even the knights of the pad and poſt are not without the terms of art, and aptneſs of expreſſion, peculiar to their vocation. I have often wondered at that untoward propenſity men have to *treat* of ſubjects totally foreign to their *habits* and *purſuits*. The greateſt men have fallen into this unaccountable error, whereof I have freſh in my memory many dead and living examples. Cardinal Richelieu, though one of the moſt able and pro-

ſon, at the bar of the Houſe of Lords, reſpecting the mode of conſtituting the court, and ſummoning the witneſſes who were to try and give evidence on the Court Martial on Sir Hugh Palliſer.

found

found ſtateſmen Europe ever beheld, would needs be a *lover*, and write *amorous* Epiſtles, which ſerved only to render him ridiculous. Lord George Germaine thought he was formed by *nature* for a great *military* commander, and by knowledge and experience for the miniſter of war in a great empire, at a moſt arduous and important period, whereon I ſhall make *no* comment. Lord Stormont eſteems himſelf a great *practical* politician: I am ſorry he did not *ſtudy* under a more able and fortunate maſter: and our author *infected* by a ſimilar diſorder or happy ſelf-complacency, has *aſpired* to the eminent rank of a perſon deeply verſed, and ably documented in the *ragio de ſtato*, which I do aver, was a very great miſtake; not but I am ready to acknowledge that every man, however weak his organs of perception may be, has his *forte*; ſo has our hiſtorian: Matriculated *early* in mobbiſh and riotous habits, how *feelingly* does he repreſent, how *elegantly* does he dwell; and with what energy *ſtreet* eloquence and unrivalled ability does he deſcribe the *riots* occaſioned by the acquittal of Mr. Keppel.

> " *Smit* with the love of *ſiſters art he* came,
> And met *congenial*, mingling *flame* with *flame!*"

Genius and invention, matured by habit and a perfect knowledge of the ſubject, are, in my humble opinion, the great ſubſtantial re-

quiſites of a great author, whether in verſe or proſe. Our hiſtorian ſeems to poſſeſs them all in the higheſt degree; there is an apparent cogeniality between his *deſcriptive* talents, and his *invention*; while his *habits* and *bent* of mind reflect, as it were a peculiar beauty and ſtrength on the whole.

As this may be deemed a great conceſſion from an avowed antagoniſt, I have thought proper to give the following quotations by way of corollary:

Speaking of the riots which ſucceeded Mr. Keppel's acquittal, he ſays, " That men of the firſt families in this country ſhould *diſguiſe* themſelves like *porters*, to force illuminations, by breaking windows, is a circumſtance which *throws* an indelible ſtain upon the times, as well as the party ‡; and again: that in the hour of adſcitious intoxication and boldneſs, *they* (men of the *firſt* families in this country diſguiſed like porters) attacked the feeble and old among the men, and terrified into fits and miſcarriages *ſeveral* women, by the rude barbarity of their behaviour. However, as a *juſt* retribution for their wanton cruelties, many of them ſuffered under the hands (fiſts) and *cudgels* of the injured; and ſeveral were carried into *round-houſes*, covered with ignominious marks

‡ Page 18.

(all

(all black or blue) of the chaſtiſement, they had received." * *Quod erat demonſtrandum.*

This deſcription of the *bruiſings* and kennel-*drubbings* of thoſe midnight rioters, recalls to my mind two beautiful lines of Pope.

> Theſe well-ſung woes, ſhall *ſooth* my penſive ghoſt,
> He *beſt* can *paint* them, who ſhall *feel* them *moſt*.

But to return to ſomething more grave and appoſite to the ſubject of theſe obſervations, in which neither *habit*, great *genius*, or the moſt extenſive powers of *invention* will avail.

Admiral Keppel and his friends having been pretty well purified by the ordeal of a court martial, round-houſe confinement, baſtinadoes, and fiſty-cuffs, are preſented to us in a new light, under the appellation of *oppoſition* †.

" Mr. Fox introduced the firſt of a long ſtring of motions, which he owned led to an addreſs for the removal of the firſt lord of the Admiralty. In ſupport of the motion he alledged, that the noble lord at the head of the Admiralty had as early as the month of November, 1777, ſolemnly pledged himſelf in his official capacity, that there were thirty-five ſhips of the line ready for ſea and fit for actual ſervice; that there were not ſix ſhips of the line fit for ſea in the following

* Page 18. † Page 21.

March,

March, that early in the month of June, the admiral was ſent to cruize on the coaſt of France with twenty ſhips of the line only; that there were twenty-ſeven ſhips of the line lying in Breſt water, and that from theſe ſuppoſed facts he deduced this concluſion, that the miniſtry who had led the nation into ſo perilous a ſituation, ought inſtantly to be removed, as unequal to the truſt committed to their charge.

" In oppoſition to thoſe aſſertions it was proved by *official* documents, that in November, 1777, there were actually thirty-five ſhips of the line ready for ſea, that in the month of March, 1778, *ſome* more ſhips were in a ſtate of great forwardneſs; that the whole number fit for meeting an enemy in the month of June, was *forty-four*; that when Mr. Keppel ſailed, there were but *ſeventeen* ſhips in the Harbour of Breſt, and that upon the whole, the board of admiralty had *placed* a number of ſhips under the command of admiral Keppel, even to the ſatisfaction of the admiral himſelf; that therefore, as the premiſes endeavoured to be eſtabliſhed by oppoſition, were *not* founded in *fact*, their concluſions muſt of courſe fall to the ground*."

* Vide the ſpeech of Lord Sandwich in the courſe of the ſeveral debates on the addreſs, and Lord Chatham's motions in the months of November and December, 1777.

As Mr. Fox's motion of the 3d of March, includes the whole of the conteſt and ſubject matter, which came into diſcuſſion as well on that day as on the 8th and 16th of the ſame month, and the 19th of April; and has equal reference to the facts and arguments which were brought forward on Lord Briſtol's motion of the 29th of April, for the actual and immediate removal of the firſt lord of the admiralty, I ſhall endeavour to bring the whole into one point of view within as narrrow a compaſs as in my power.

Our hiſtorian, as he can *invent* at will and *add* at pleaſure, ſo it is pretty evident that he is equally dextrous at mutilating and ſuppreſſing when it anſwers his purpoſe, of which the following examples will be ſufficient.

Mr. Fox's charge founded upon Lord Sandwich's ſpeeches in the winter ſeſſion, 1777, was *not* that the noble lord had pledged himſelf, &c. that there were *thirty-five* ſhips of the line ready for ſea and fit for actual ſervice, but that there were thirty-five actually ready, and *ſeven* more in ſuch a ſtate of fordwardneſs and preparation as to be ready for ſea in a *few* days, towards the manning of which the ſupernumeraries aboard the *other* ſhips amounted to three thouſand men, and the complement of the whole forty-two was deficient but 3000 more, which defi-

deficency could be ſupplied by an embargo and warm preſs, in a week or ten days, or a *fortnight* at *fartheſt**.

Mr. Fox's aſſertion was not that in March, 1778, at the end of four months, when Mr. Keppel was appointed to his command, that there were *not more* than *ſix* ſhips out of the whole number fit for ſervice. On the contrary, Mr. Fox acknowledged that there were *fourteen* ſhips in different ports and out on different cruizes; but that when Mr. Keppel went down to Portſmouth, there were not *collected there* more than *ſix* ſhips "*fit to meet a ſeaman's eye*†."

That Mr. Fox did ſay, that early in the month of June, when the weſtern ſquadron ſailed, it conſiſted but of *twenty* ſhips of the line, though there were at that time *twenty-ſeven* lying in Breſt Water, I allow; nay more, that probably the *other five*, which ſailed early in July, were likewiſe there, though there was no proof of the fact before the houſe†.

So far I thought it neceſſary to clear my way, becauſe to paſs judgment it is as neceſſary to be acquainted with whatever has been really *averred* by the plaintiff, as what has

* See Note, P. 70.

† Vide the ſpeeches of Mr. Fox, Admiral Keppel, Admiral Pigot, Lord Howe, &c. on Mr. Fox's ſeveral motions, 3d, 8th, and 18th of March; 19th and 27th of April 1779, & *paſſim*.

been

been urged in extenuation or *expreſſly* denied by the defendant; an omiſſion of *ſeven ſhips* of the line is, I perceive, *nothing* in the plaiſtic hand of our Author, who finds facts as obedient to the forms he would wiſh to mould them into, as dough, or any of thoſe modern cements invented for the ornamenting the fronts of our houſes, which anſwer the purpoſes of a ſhort lived external ſhow, but are not proof againſt the ravages of time and the viciſſitudes of weather.

Upon the conduct of the Admiralty Board the aſſurances the leading members of that board gave in both houſes relative to its ſtate of preparation and actual condition, the Navy was in before Chriſtmas, 1777; adminiſtration and oppoſition are at iſſue; and as an advocate for *no* party, but as a ſincere *friend* to my country, I deſire to be heard ſhortly in reply. I ſhall ſtate nothing but facts; I ſhall reaſon upon none but ſuch as are ſupported by direct proof, or are founded in public notoriety; nor make a ſingle concluſion, but what thoſe facts directly lead to.

Our Hiſtorian's firſt aſſertion is, that it was proved from official *documents*, that in November, 1777, *there were* thirty five ſhips of the line ready for ſea. If this had been really proved, it would amount to no more than evidence in *part*, that is, that thirty-five out of *forty-two*, ſtated by Lord Sandwich,

were really ready in November. But the truth is, that not a ſcrap of official paper, not a *ſingle document* reſpecting the effective ſtrength of the Britiſh navy in November, 1777, or at any other ſubſequent period up to this inſtant, has been laid on the table of either houſe of parliament*. If our Author is really conſcious, or pretends to believe the verbal aſſurances of Lord Sandwich in one houſe, and Lord Mulgrave in the other, or the unauthenticated memorandums taken out of their Lordſhips reſpective pockets to anſwer the temporary purpoſes of debate, are to be conſidered, received and relied on as official *documents*, I pity his credulity, or muſt hold his evaſive arts in deſerved contempt. If ſuch evidence were to ſtand in the place of legal proof, no culprit, however *attrocious* or *criminal*, could ever be convicted. The culprit, who at the bar inſiſts on his innocence, *becauſe* he *has* documents in his poſſeſſion, which he ſays *would* prove it, and yet *declines* to produce them, reſting his defence upon *mere aſſertion*, would not ſtand, I preſume, in a very favourable light in a court of juſtice*.

* Vide the ſeveral motions made in the courſe of the ſeſſions 1777-8, and 1778-9, by the Dukes of Richmond and Bolton, and Lords Effingham, Briſtol, &c. in one houſe, and Meſſieurs Fox, Barre, Dunning, and Luttrell in the other, every one of which were loſt either by a direct negative, or the previous queſtion.

So

So much for *official documents*, and the credit thoſe deſerve, who would found the juſtification of the noble lord at the head of the admiralty upon ſuch looſe and ſandy ground as the aſſurances of men who were not aſhamed to contradict themſelves daily, and afterwards defy their accuſers to produce proof.

The next aſſertion, which grows out of the other, is, that *ſome* more ſhips were ready in the month of March, and that the whole number fit for meeting an enemy in June, were *forty-four*.

On this I ſhall firſt obſerve; Lord Sandwich aſſerted, that on the 19th of November, 1777, there *were* and *would* be ready in a week, ten days, or a fortnight, *forty-two* ſhips of the line ready for actual ſervice.

The fulfilling of this aſſurance, *bound* the noble Lord to the completion of his promiſe at, or before the 3d of December, but I will not diſpute about a few days. I will allow his Lordſhip and our author, his Lordſhip's *echo* on *this* occaſion, another week to the 10th of December. What then is the obſervation, which naturally ſuggeſts itſelf on reading this paſſage? but that Lord Sandwich pledged himſelf to the houſe of lords, that he would have forty-two ſhips of the line ready to proceed to ſea at an hour or a day's warning on the 10th of December, and yet in *ſix months* after, namely, on the 10th of June, when

Admiral Keppel ſailed on a cruize off Uſhant, and Admiral Byron rode at ſingle anchor off Plymouth, the whole naval force, including the home defence as well as the ſhips that ſailed in the interim, did not amount, according to our author's *own* account, to more than *forty-four**.

The moſt anxious exertions and unremitting efforts had been making for full three months, and yet no greater addition had been made to the original force from the preceding November than two ſhips. If this were not a *full anſwer* to Lord Sandwich and Lord Mulgrave's *documents*, as ſtated by our author, the following facts will, I preſume, remove all *poſſibility* of *doubt* on that ſubject.

Two of the ſhips, the Mars, and, I believe, the Worceſter †, were actually condemned and ordered to be broke up. Were thoſe ſhips *fit* for actual ſervice in November, if they were condemned in January? Two of this ideal fleet were not repaired in June; and two more out of the forty-four were not fit to proceed on ſervice, even on the 11th of June, the day Byron ſailed from Plymouth Sound; ſo that the whole of this formidable Armada, which on the 19th of November,

* Page 22.

† Vide Lord Sandwich's ſpeech, 3d March, 1778, and Lord Mulgrave's and Mr. Buller's 1ſt and 2d December, 1778.

1777, was ſai—d to amount to *forty-two* fit for ſea early in December, conſiſted of but *thirty-eight* in the *beginning* of the enſuing June, of which the following is an account of the diſtribution.

Twenty under Admiral Keppel, *thirteen* under Admiral Byron, *three* under Admiral Barrington and on the Weſt-India ſtation, one ſent with the commiſſioners to North America in May, and one in Port*. But the truth was, that both in December and till towards the latter end of March, the whole of the Britiſh navy, for the home ſervice and detachments, did not amount to more than *twenty* ſhips of the line, in which the two *broken up* and the *crazy crippled* ſhips cruizing in the Bay and off Cape Finiſterre, were included.

On our author's *third* aſſertion, that when Mr. Keppel ſailed in June with twenty ſhips, there were but *ſeventeen* fit for ſea in Breſt water, I ſhall not trouble my readers with much detail. Mr. Keppel certainly was taught to expect that this was *really* the caſe; and he was ſo honeſt and open to ſay he did not believe it, when he ſailed: he imagined they might be twenty; he meaſured them in his mind at more; he had his doubts, they might be *twenty-four*; and *ſuch* a *diſparity* did not *diſcourage* him. He *truſted* much to the bravery and ſkill of

* Vide Lord Mulgrave's Speeches 2d and 3d December, 1778.

his

his officers, &c. and as for the ſhips, their ſtate condition, and the manner they were manned and provided, afforded him no reaſon to complain *; but when he found by the capture of the Pallas and Licorne, the paper containing the anchorage of *twenty-ſeven* ſhips of the line in Breſt water, he confeſſed he was both *mortified* and *alarmed*; mortified that he found himſelf obliged for the *firſt* time to turn his back on the enemy, and alarmed for the *ſafety* of his country, which materially depended upon his return into port, in order to procure a reinforcement †.

The only arguments adminiſtration reſorted to, which carried with them a *ſhadow* of weight were, that ſome French merchant ſhips, having been permitted to paſs through Mr. Keppel's fleet on the 20th, if the French had ſo great a ſuperiority, they would certainly have come immediately out of Breſt, in queſt of the Britiſh fleet; and that a paper of anchorage *without date* was *no* proof of any ſuch force being in Breſt water, but that ſuch a force *was* or might come into it.

To the firſt of theſe plauſible ſubilties I anſwer, that by the laſt accounts recei-

* Admiral Keppel's ſpeeches 3d, 8th and 19th of April, on Mr. Fox's motions, and upon the motion for a copy of the ſentence delivered by the Court Martial on Sir Hugh Palliſer, April 27th.

† Ibid.

ved

ved by the French miniſtry, the Britiſh fleet conſiſted in all of thirty three ſhips of the line. The fleets did not leave the land till the 14th of June; nor was the actual deſtination of Byron certainly known till the 21ſt or 22d in London. It was univerſally believed, I grant, that Byron's ſquadron was intended for the relief of Lord Howe, then ſuppoſed to be at New-York; but how was it poſſible for the French cabinet to truſt with any degree of ſafety to the intelligence received from the merchant ſhips, which paſſed through Mr. Keppel's fleet, *till* they had certain accounts, that the two ſquadrons had actually *ſeparated?* This certainly could not reach Paris till about the firſt of July. Great conſideration was neceſſary on ſuch an occaſion; ſailing orders reached Breſt on the 4th, though d'Orvilliers did not weigh anchor till the 6th of July, nor was clear of the land, till the 8th *.

To the ſecond, a few words will be ſufficient, not only to *prove* that the Breſt fleet conſiſted of *twenty-ſeven* ſhips of the line, but moſt probably of *thirty-two*, the *day* the Pallas and Licorne French frigates were taken. The paper was without date, but by the

* Speeches of Colonel Barre, Mr. Fox and Governor Johnſon, on the ſame motion.

examination

examination of ſome of the priſoners taken aboard, it appeared that the anchorage had been *long ſince* ordered; that the ſhips were probably *anchored* for *ſeveral* days, as they were, when the examinants *left* Breſt, ready to come out into Breſt water, and that five more were, before the date of the examination, in the ſame predicament; beſides, if on the 4th of July thirty-two ſhips of the line were ready to weigh anchor in Breſt water, human credulity could not be ſo far impoſed on, as to ſwallow the manifeſt improbability, that *fifteen* ſhips of the line could be fitted out, manned, and equipped in the ſhort ſpace of three weeks*. But in this, as well as the ſtate of the Britiſh fleet in November, 1777, all documents were refuſed. The examination of the priſoners taken aboard the Pallas and the Licorne, in the preſence of the admiral, with his reaſons contained in a letter to the admiralty board were with-hled, and Mr. Fox's motion left to find its way upon the proofs contained in a paper without date.

If any thing however ſeems wanting to fix the *lie direct* upon the aſſertion of Lord Sandwich in one houſe, and Lord Mulgrave in the other, it is the *candid acknowledgment* of Lord Gower, one of his Majeſty's cabinet miniſters, who ingenuouſly confeſſed, that on the 5th

* Admiral Keppel's ſpeech, March 8.

of

of June, he had good reaſon to *know*, and *every reaſon* to *believe*, that the French fleet on that day, lying in Breſt Water, amounted to *twenty-five* or *twenty-ſix* ſhips of the line; on which account, he *highly* approved of the *prudence*, *ſound* judgment and diſcretion exerciſed by the admiral, in returning into port as ſoon as he received the very alarming information he obtained aboard the Pallas and Licorne.*

Our author's next aſſertion, I will call it an *opinion*, is, that had it appeared that there was a greater force in Breſt Water, it was known to ſeamen, that an inferior force may block up a ſuperior one. It will be ſufficient to remark, that the wind which would have *kept* the French *in*, muſt have blown ſtrong from the ſouth eaſt, which, conſidering the nature of that part of the French coaſt, would have been a moſt perilous ſtation, had it blown freſh. Beſides, on the very firſt ſhift of wind, the French might have got *out*, and the deſtruction of the Britiſh fleet be thereby hazarded, if not effected. But, to at once *diſpoſe* of this pitiful attempt to miſlead the reader, I ſhall only obſerve, that Admiral Keppel's ſtation, by his inſtructions, was *not* off Breſt, but Uſhant; and that he would not have blocked up the fleet in Breſt harbour by cruizing off Uſhant.

* Vide Lord Gower's ſpeech, April 23, 1779.

Our author contends, that upon the whole, the Board of Admiralty had placed a number of ſhips *adequate* to the ſervice under Admiral Keppel's command, even to the *ſatisfaction* of the Admiral himſelf.

This laſt aſſertion is already fully anſwered; but I cannot avoid making one obſervation on it: if the Admiral was ſatisfied that there was only *ſeventeen*, or even *twenty* or twenty-four, he had no right to complain; but if through ignorance, or preconcerted treachery, he was *led* into an hazardous, and, peradventure, a fatal ſecurity, ſurely, as a profeſſional man, and a friend of his country, he had every reaſon imaginable to be actuated with private reſentment and public indignation, at an act equally replete with the extremes of wickedneſs and folly, by which the deareſt intereſts, nay, the very exiſtence of his country, as an independent ſtate, were committed to ſo dangerous and unequal a conteſt, with an enemy in every reſpect, of number of ſhips, men, weight of metal, guns, and effective ſtrength, ſuperior. I ſhall therefore, in the words of our author, conclude this part of the ſubject, with ſaying, That *as* the premiſes *endeavoured* to be eſtabliſhed by *adminiſtration*, were *not* founded in *fact*, their *concluſions* of courſe muſt fall to the ground.

I could enlarge much on the miſchievous conſequences which have ariſen from this fatal

neglect

neglect of our navy, and the unpardonable inattention of thoſe, whoſe duty it was to provide againſt them. So early at leaſt as the contract between France and America, for the ſupply of a ſtated quantity of tobacco, was openly avowed by the court of Verſailles, whatever reaſons we might before have had for avoiding an immediate rupture, the real intentions of that court remained no longer doubtful. That circumſtance was publickly known in London for ſome weeks previous to the meeting of parliament in 1777. The public reception of Dr. Franklin at Verſailles, as a miniſter from an independent and ſovereign ſtate; the frequent congés or permiſſions given to ſeveral officers of rank to ſerve in the rebel army; but *above all*, the great diligence and uncommon diſpatch which France exerted in putting her navy upon a reſpectable and formidable footing, for the ten months preceding that period *, bore the ſtrongeſt and moſt inequivocal indications of her ultimate views. I am ready to acknowledge, that in ſome of the preceding ſtages of this accurſed American war, the court of London, had they acted upon any fixed ſyſtem, which it is now evident they did not, might have ſome very powerful motives for *concealing* their ſuſpicions and for ſmothering their reſentments; but as

* Vide ſpeeches in both houſes; ſeſſion 1778.

ſoon as all theſe circumſtances concurred to warn them of the approaching ſtorm, adminiſtration ſhould have uſed every poſſible induſtry, and have made the moſt vigorous *efforts to counteract* the deſigns of the enemy. Inſtead of that, they had reſource only to *high ſounding expreſſions*. The King's Speech was full of them; they were echoed back from both houſes: but as ſoon as the vote for 60,000 ſeamen to be employed for the enſuing year paſſed the committee of ſupply, the *ſame feebleneſs*, *languor*, *inattention*, and every *other* ſymptom of indolence and irreſolution ſeemed to have ſpread itſelf, and ſeized every deliberative and executive part of government. The men were *voted*, the money *granted*, but miniſters *ſlept*.

Still, however, the events of the American campaign were not known, at leaſt publickly, though the fate of General Burgoyne, unſupported as he muſt be, was eaſily foreſeen.

What did miniſters do in that interim? They formed *petty cabals*, and employed obſcure agents to tamper with Doctor Franklyn. In the midſt of this valet-negociation*, the

* The firſt agent employed in the important negociation of reſtoring peace, and its wonted dignity and ſplendour to the Britiſh empire, it is affirmed, upon good authority, was an old German, who had lived in a nobleman's family in the character of butler or valet de chambre.

diſaſter at Saratoga ſtruck them like a flaſh of lightening; though I am ſorry to ſay, it did not electrify or ſtimulate them to any active, vigorous, or uſeful purpoſe. The tools and emiſſaries which they employed at *other* places, diſappeared and ſhrunk into nothing, as ſpirits are ſaid to do at the ſight of day, the inſtant General Burgoyne's defeat was known at Paris.

In ſuch a critical conjuncture, miniſters, as if in a fit of *political deſpair* and diſtraction, abandoned *every* thing, inſtead of *preparing* for *war* or negociating a *peace*; inſtead of endeavouring to gain America over by outbidding France, or of putting their country in a ſubſtantial ſtate of defence, or the navy into a condition to act offenſively againſt the enemy, they *adjourned* parliament for *ſix weeks*. Miniſters *fled* from all buſineſs, I will not ſay to regale themſelves with Chriſtmas fare, a theme of ridicule at the time, while their unhappy country was bleeding at every pore; while its deſtruction was planning by a powerful inveterate enemy, and our national dignity and character was rapidly declining at every court in Europe.

But as we ſee great *folly* and great *art* frequently unite in the ſame perſon, it is no leſs frequent to behold thoſe individual qualities mix in aſſemblies, and produce in the aggregate ſimilar effects. A *congregation* of *knaves* and

and *blockheads*, impreſſed by the *ſame* motives, and enlightned by the ſame ſize of underſtanding, carry all their folly and chicane into council. I never ſaw a ſtronger confirmation of this remark than happened at the period I am now ſpeaking of.

As miniſters had emiſſaries and petty negociators at Paris, they were not wanting for *inſtruments* of the ſame kind nearer home. If they were *cobweb-ſpinning* in France, they were *net* making in Britain. Such tools are the growth of every country, and this ſeems to be in no danger of loſing the ſpecies. A few adulatory addreſſes were procured in the North of England,* containing offers of raiſing regiments, on receiving the accounts of the captivity of Mr. Burgoyne. The mine being previouſly prepared was ſuddenly ſprung, and an *hive* of *northern barbarians* came up with addreſſes, but like ſo many *Scotch pedlars* offered their ſervices in order to make the beſt bargain they could, or rather like ſo many German wholeſale *carcaſe butchers*, preſented themſelves at the *treaſury ſhambles*. The bargain was inſtantly ſtruck, the nation was *filled* with *loyalty*, *toryiſm*, and *recruiting* parties. The paltry loſs of 5000 men was thought nothing of when almoſt three times that number was procured or engaged for in the courſe of a few weeks. France continued to

* Mancheſter, Liverpool, &c.

repeat

repeat her *former* friendly aſſurances*. America was to be ſubdued and our fleet was able to cope with the united power of all our enemies, or of all Europe ſhould they unite againſt us†. No miniſter was fit to preſide at the head of the Admiralty who did not take care to have a fleet *equal* if not *ſuperior* to France and Spain‡, and that miniſter who did not take care to provide a force ſuperior to the whole Houſe of Bourbon, would deſerve to loſe his head§.

In the midſt of this ſcene of the moſt conſummate folly, deluſion, *miniſterial impoſition*, unaccountable treachery and national infatuation, another thunder ſtorm, more violent than any of the former, was heard, which threatened to overwhelm us in ruin. While Lord North was holding forth the olive branch to the people of America, and ſhewing the improbability of France taking any public part in the diſpute between Great-Britain and her Colonies, a very reſpectable member|| roſe in his place and informed the

* Vide Lord North's ſpeeches throughout the whole winter ſeſſion, 1777, particularly the very day his Lordſhip carried the vote of adjournment, December 10th and February 16th, 1778, when he propoſed the conciliatory bills. † Ibid.

‡ Vide Lord Sandwich's ſpeeches on the addreſs, November 19th and 28th, December 1ſt, 4th, and 11th, Feb. 2d, 4th, and 9th, March 3d and 8th, 1778.

§ Ibid. || Mr. Fox.

Houſe,

Houſe, that he had an account the preceding evening from Paris which might be depended upon, he was perſuaded, though he could not accompany it with that ſpecies of proof which amounts to legal evidence in a court of juſtice, which was, that preciſely *ten days* before, France, and the aſſociated ſtates of America, had entered into a treaty political and commercial, by the firſt of which thoſe ſtates were acknowledged to be ſovereign and independent; and by the ſecond, trade and commerce was to be opened between both countries*.

Yet ſuch was the *confidence* of the miniſter, that in reply to the gentleman who communicated this information, he ſaid he *did not believe* it, or if the fact was ſo he was totally ignorant of it, not having received *any* notification of it from the Britiſh miniſter at the court of Verſailles†.

The ſame queſtion was put by a noble Duke‡ in the other Houſe in three weeks after, (5th of March) and a ſimilar anſwer returned by the Secretary of State for the northern department§, though it afterwards came

* Vide Mr. Fox's ſpeech Feb. 16th, 1778.

† Lord North in reply the ſame evening.

‡ Duke of Grafton, who put the queſtion to the Secretaries of State on the authority of Mr. Fox, who, he obſerved, had put a ſimilar queſtion in the other Houſe. His Grace added, that he believed the fact, but expected no direct anſwer.

§ Said he was totally ignorant of any ſuch treaty.

out in proof, from a perſon whoſe word could not decently be queſtioned*, that the Britiſh cabinet had received the earlieſt intelligence of every progreſſive ſtep taken in the courſe of the negociation, to the final completion of the treaty, and not only of the *public* tenor of the treaty, but the *ſecret* article which bound the parties to hearken to *no* condition or ſcheme of accommodation which had not the unqualified local ſupremacy and independence of the United States for its baſis†.

I have referred to thoſe circumſtances chiefly to point out the *indolence* and *criminal* inactivity of our miniſters, in not making *timely* and effectual naval preparations, in order to defeat the deſigns of the Houſe of Bourbon; becauſe I am perſuaded if we had *forty-two* ſhips of the line in December, 1777, we could with eaſe have brought ſuch a naval force to bear upon France, or France and Spain united, as would have prevented either one or both of them from interfering in the diſputes with our colonies, and that ſo early

* Lord Stormont, then ambaſſador at the court of Verſailles.

† Lord Stormont on the day the French reſcript was laid before Parliament, March 16th, gave the lie direct to both the firſt Lord of the Treaſury and the noble Viſcount, in whoſe department he acted. Lord Weymouth, then for the firſt time, acknowledged he received ſuch an account from the ambaſſador, but he did not believe it, nor truſt to the information ſo far as to venture to act upon it.

as the middle or latter end of the enſuing May.

By an authentic paper now lying before me, I am informed, that from the 16th of March, or the day Mr. Keppel arrived at Portſmouth to examine into the ſtate of the fleet and take upon him the command, to the *middle* of *July*, there were upwards of *twenty-five* ſhips of the line fitted out for actual ſervice. Now only let us in idea puſh thoſe exertions back into the months of November and December, and we have good reaſon to conclude, that we might have had a force *ready for ſea* in May, 1778, of at leaſt *ſixty-five* or *ſeventy* ſhips of the line of battle; a force, I will maintain, every way equal at *that* period to give law, not only to France, but to the whole houſe of Bourbon in *every* quarter of the globe. We could have ſpared a ſquadron for the Mediterranean, for the Weſt-Indies and North America, and have reſerved a ſufficient force for the home defence. The *truth* is, there would have been no *occaſion*. Had we really been in the *ſtate* of *preparation* ſo often aſſerted by Lord Sandwich in November, or if we had began to make the *ſame efforts* in *October* or *November* which we did in March, the treaty between France and the colonies would probably have never taken place; but if it had, the conſequences muſt have been, on the premiſes laid down,

down, the total ruin of the French commerce, the capture of one half of their ſeamen; or if they ventured out, the *certain* deſtruction of their marine.

Having in the courſe of theſe obſervations had frequent opportunities to now and then attend to the witticiſms, quaint phraſes, and epigrammatic points, ſo thickly ſtrewed throughout this bundle of factious ſquibiſm, very little more remains for me to ſay. The work has had its uſe in the *opinion* of thoſe whoſe countenance or inſtructions were the cauſe of calling it into being; the remainder is compoſed of mere news-paper falſhood and declamation; and ſeems to have been gathered out of the miniſterial paragraphs and groſs miſrepreſentations, with which the daily prints are ſtuffed, or to have been ſtitched together by this ingenious literary tagger of ſhreds and patches. He has rung the changes over and over again, proclaiming the treachery and folly of oppoſition, without adducing a ſingle fact to ſupport his charges.

As there are mixed here and there in this compound of impoſition and the news-paper ſquibs of the day, a perſonal attack on Admiral Keppel, partly diſtinct from the charges urged againſt him, as an officer; and partial queſtions from the evidence delivered at the bar of the Houſe of Commons, reſpecting the conduct of Sir William Howe, and as there

may be many perſons, who not having the means of knowing the motives which apparently induced Admiral Keppel to decline the command of the weſtern ſquadron, or the nature and weight of the evidence oppoſed to the confident aſſertions of Mr. Galloway, and the doating reveries of a ſuperannuated driveler; I will conclude thoſe obſervations with a few ſtrictures on the comparative authority of the teſtimony of both parties.

The firſt reference our author makes, is to a paſſage in General Robertſon's evidence. "That, the *reſult* of the enquiry was very different from what oppoſition expected. It *appeared*, that rebellion aroſe from an ambitious faction, and not from the general ſenſe of the body of the people *."

I never heard that there was any reſult or opinion given, nor do I believe there was. General Robertſon in another part of his evidence ſaid, that there was *no* faction in America previous to the commencement of hoſtilities, but that the people were *unanimous* in two things, in their loyalty and affection towards the preſent ſtate, and a fixed reſolution *not* to be *taxed* by the Britiſh Parliament. He never heard of only one man, (Mr. Otis) in all America, who wiſhed to contend for independence, and he

* Page 32 of the Hiſtory.

was

was conſidered as a perſon maintaining very extraordinary opinions *.

" That the reduction of that faction, and conſequently the extinction of rebellion, had uniformly been the object of adminiſtration †;" not ſurely when *all* America was *univerſally* loyal and affectionate; if then there was no faction exiſting in America by the general's own account, *previous* to the commencement of hoſtilities, the *general* or the *hiſtorian* muſt have *forgot* to tell the *truth*.

General Robertſon ſaid, " that a much greater force than was neceſſary or wiſhed for, was ſent to America ‡." On explanation, the general *recollected* that when he ſaid a force of 20,000 men was thought extravagant, he reſerved that opinion as being the prevailing one, in the winter, 1774, the year the rebellion commenced.

" The rebels had never 10,000 men, which the general eked out according as his memory *ſerved* him, to 16,000, and had conſequently been never ſo numerous as Sir William Howe §." General Robertſon never went *beyond* the *limits* of York-Iſland after New-York was taken; and on his paſſage back and forward, from February 1777, to the following September.

* Page 31 and 32, note (a). † Ibid.
‡ Ibid. § Page 33.

" That

" That the enemy were an undiſciplined rabble*" *witneſs* the obſtinate ſtand they made on Long Iſland, where they ſeemed deſtitute of all military knowledge, but appeared deſtitute of neither *courage* nor battalion diſcipline; and though not conſiſting of quite 6000 men, made an obſtinate reſiſtance of ſeveral hours, againſt one of the *beſt* diſciplined armies in Europe, upwards of three times their number. Lords Cornwallis, Harrington and Belcarras, General Grey, Sir George Oſborne, Colonel Kingſton, Majors Montreſor, Blomfield, Forbes, Captain Money, &c. are, *una voce*, of a different opinion.

" The inferences deducible, ſays our author, from thoſe *facts*, are that the Britiſh army was either *unſkilfully* or *languidly* led †". General Robertſon gives him here the lie direct, for he ſaid he never ſaw a finer or more judicious diſpoſition in his life, than was made previous to the action on Long Iſland. Lord Cornwallis gave the *ſame* honourable teſtimony reſpecting the diſpoſition made at the Brandywine; and as to the deduction drawn by our author of Sir William Howe's *languor* and *ſupineneſs* ‡, General Robertſon anſwered, Sir William Howe was *always alert*. " I ſent my Aid du Camp to inform him that my brigade was ready to march; on his return, he told

* Page 33. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid.

me,

me, Sir William was *gone out* in *purſuit* of the rebels. When the grenadiers and 33d regiment were called back from the lines at Broolyn, I dare ſay Sir William Howe was *near* the *front* of the army. He executed a fine manœuvre, by getting *between* the *lines* and ſeveral rebel battalions, ſurrounded and cut off their retreat, and made 2000 priſoners †.

" Some of the troops, grenadiers, and 33d regiment were going to ſtorm the lines, Sir William Howe called them back—I *halted* for orders, not thinking it adviſable to advance, and I was well pleaſed when I found the general coincide with me in opinion ‡".

" Putnam, who had the command of 7000 men, had detached all but 300; but it was not known. What, in the face of a victorious enemy and before the fate of the day was decided could it be expected ?

" Our army in the Jerſies was 17,000 men, Sir William Howe had 40,874. *Memory* does not enable a man to be exact in returns; I only gave *extracts*. I mean the troops, including ſick, priſoners, &c. the whole amount in the Jerſies, at Rhode Iſland, York Iſland, and their dependencies, were 29,478§." It was proved by authentic documents that

† Vide General Robertſon's evidence on the third day's examination at the bar of the Houſe of Commons, *& paſſim.*

‡ Ibid.

§ Ibid. firſt and fourth day's examination.

they

" That the enemy were an undiſciplined rabble*" *witneſs* the obſtinate ſtand they made on Long Iſland, where they ſeemed deſtitute of all military knowledge, but appeared deſtitute of neither *courage* nor battalion diſcipline; and though not conſiſting of quite 6000 men, made an obſtinate reſiſtance of ſeveral hours, againſt one of the *beſt* diſciplined armies in Europe, upwards of three times their number. Lords Cornwallis, Harrington and Belcarras, General Grey, Sir George Oſborne, Colonel Kingſton, Majors Montreſor, Blomfield, Forbes, Captain Money, &c. are, *una voce*, of a different opinion.

" The inferences deducible, ſays our author, from thoſe *facts*, are that the Britiſh army was either *unſkilfully* or *languidly* led †". General Robertſon gives him here the lie direct, for he ſaid he never ſaw a finer or more judicious diſpoſition in his life, than was made previous to the action on Long Iſland. Lord Cornwallis gave the *ſame* honourable teſtimony reſpecting the diſpoſition made at the Brandywine; and as to the deduction drawn by our author of Sir William Howe's *languor* and *ſupineneſs* ‡, General Robertſon anſwered, Sir William Howe was *always alert*. " I ſent my Aid du Camp to inform him that my brigade was ready to march; on his return, he told

* Page 33. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid.

me,

me, Sir William was *gone out* in *purſuit* of the rebels. When the grenadiers and 33d regiment were called back from the lines at Broolyn, I dare ſay Sir William Howe was *near* the *front* of the army. He executed a fine manœuvre, by getting *between* the *lines* and ſeveral rebel battalions, ſurrounded and cut off their retreat, and made 2000 priſoners †.

" Some of the troops, grenadiers, and 33d regiment were going to ſtorm the lines, Sir William Howe called them back—I *halted* for orders, not thinking it adviſable to advance, and I was well pleaſed when I found the general coincide with me in opinion ‡".

" Putnam, who had the command of 7000 men, had detached all but 300; but it was not known. What, in the face of a victorious enemy and before the fate of the day was decided could it be expected ?

" Our army in the Jerſies was 17,000 men, Sir William Howe had 40,874. *Memory* does not enable a man to be exact in returns; I only gave *extracts*. I mean the troops, including ſick, priſoners, &c. the whole amount in the Jerſies, at Rhode Iſland, York Iſland, and their dependencies, were 29,478§." It was proved by authentic documents that

† Vide General Robertſon's evidence on the third day's examination at the bar of the Houſe of Commons, & *paſſim*.

‡ Ibid.

§ Ibid. firſt and fourth day's examination.

they

they were ſhort of 27,000. Sir William Howe ſtated the real returns from a paper which he read in his place.

" The rebels, ſome ſaid, were 8, 9 and 10,000 in the Jerſies, when encamped at Quibbleton—I do *not* know what the rebel force might be, I was *not* then in the country, there were various *reports* about it. I ſaw no returns. All I have ſtated I heard from others *."

" The army may paſs from New-York to Albany in *two days* †;" if ſo, Sir Henry Clinton, who has ſpent as *many months*, deſerved to be *h——d* for his *ſervices*; the laſt accounts having not even uſhered him through the highlands.

" Many feared that General Burgoyne's army would be loſt, if not ſupported by General Howe. I wrote myſelf to Sir William Howe, that if General Burgoyne extricated himſelf, future ages would have little occaſion to talk of Hannibal. I acknowledge it was after hearing of the affair at Still Water. I *believe* it was there was an account of that action in the rebel papers ‡."

I dare ſay if it was neceſſary, I could produce above an hundred inſtances of *direct contradictions*, *confident unfounded* aſſertions, and a

* Vide General Robertſon's evidence on the firſt, ſecond, and fourth day's examination.

† Ibid ſecond and fourth day's examination.

‡ Third day's examination.

mere

mere play on words. One of the inſtances I have mentioned, is in my opinion, fully ſufficient to *decide* on the evidence of General Robertſon, and as it particularly applies to the operations now going on up the North River, under Sir Henry Clinton. I ſhall take the liberty of laying it ſomewhat in detail before my readers.

" The poſſeſſion of the highlands would *ſecure* the paſſage of the river. Frigates drawing *ſeventeen* feet of water, can go as far up as within *forty* miles of Albany, and merchant ſhips and tranſports within *twelve*. I think, the enemy being in poſſeſſion of *one* bank of the river, would *not* prevent the water communication between New-York and Albany. It would *not* be neceſſary, if obliged to anchor, to *land* and *diſlodge* the enemy. If there was an inconvenience in landing, they would *wait* till a wind offered to carry them *paſt* the battery."* In ſhort, General Robertſon contended in the *face* of the *nation*, that frigates and tranſports with troops on board and favourable weather, could go from New-York to within a few miles of Albany, with an enemy in force on either or both banks, in *two* days, and even though *contrary* winds ſhould ſpring up, *without danger* or any other inconvenience, but that of delay †. I leave this gentleman and Sir Henry Clinton to ſettle that point, and

* Second and fourth days examination.

† Third day's examination, & *paſſim*.

ſhall proceed to make a few ſtrictures on the paradoxical enigmas, and palpable contradictions which are involved in the whole of the text and context, of the *other* court witneſs; I mean the celebrated Mr. Galloway, to whom the *nation* and *Lord George Germaine* ſtand ſo highly indebted for his *journal*, his *private* negotiations, and *total want* of *memory*. This man, bred a *lawyer*, and ſelf-dubbed a *politician*, was deſigned it ſeems by nature for a *ſoldier*. Though one of the firſt and moſt buſy actors in the non-importation agreement; and one of the members of the firſt Congreſs aſſembled at Philadelphia; though he claimed a particular ſhare in framing and drawing up the plan of an American or colonial conſtitution, ſtating the reſpective rights, and marking out the lines of political connexion, between each province, and the great fæderal aſſembly in congreſs, which was to ſway and direct the whole, and aſſumed to himſelf the merit of propoſing a ground of union with the parent ſtate; yet this man after being *three* ſeſſions, or full two years in congreſs, (I believe) when examined at the bar of the Houſe of Commons, he could not remember any part of his *political* conduct; but that which related to the *framing* of this plan of accommodation.* He was *emptied* of all *recollection* of what paſſed in *congreſs*. He had taken ſhort mi-

* Vide his evidence, in anſwer to queſtions put to him by Lord George Germaine and Mr. Burke, *& paſſim.*

nutes,

nutes, it was true, upon detached *ſlips* of paper, to aſſiſt his memory, but he had never arranged them; he never looked over thoſe minutes *ſince*, nor did he think of making a journal at that time of the proceedings of congreſs; he had not the *leizure* at that time, which he had when he made his *military* and *naval journal* of every tranſaction, from the time the troops embarked at Staten Iſland, in July 1777, till Philadelphia was evacuated in June 1778.* He knew better than Lord Howe, and all the officers and pilots in his fleet, that by Cheſepeak was a tedious navigation; that landing in the Delaware was much preferable; and than Sir William Howe, and every ſubordinate commander in his army, that inſtead of puſhing on towards the Brandywine, he ſhould have marched out of the ſtrait direction, and have turned to the right, to New-Caſtle. He could tell to a minute when Waſhington left Trenton, Princeton, &c. and ſhew *why* Sir William Howe miſcarried, was becauſe inſtead of *three* or *four* o'clock in the morning, he did not riſe till *ſeven* or *eight*, by which means the rebels eſcaped deſtruction, and the general loſt the empire of North America. He could deſcribe *military* fords, conſtruct bridges of boats of wood and copper. He was a ſkilful engineer, and had reconnoitered the ground on each bank of the Delaware, the *commanding* ground on one ſide, and the ground *com-*

* Vide his ſecond day's examination.

manded on the other: pontoons, *chevaux de frize*, embarkations and debarkations, the tonnage of craft for tranſporting of troops, the accomodations aboard, and the number of men which could be carried acroſs the Delaware at each trip, formed but a very *trifling* part of this gentleman's knowledge, as a General, Adjutant General, Quarter Maſter General, Barrack Maſter General, Chief Engineer, and Director of the Artillery * ; in ſhort,

Had I ten thouſand *mouths* and *tongues*,
Had I ten thouſand *pair* of lungs,
Ten thouſand *ſkulls*, with *brains* to *think*,
Ten thouſand ſtandiſhes of ink,
Ten thouſand *hands* and *pens* to write,

it would be impoſſible for me to do this *learned General* juſtice. I ſhall however quote one inſtance or two, to ſhew the capaciouſneſs of this military advocate's mind, and the *univerſality* of his genius; of his mechanical knowledge, and his great dexterity in the ſcience of defence, or art of logical fencing, whereby a *trained* fencer may *evade* or *avoid* an *home thruſt*, and *foil* his antagoniſt.

Mr. Galloway. " I knew of no difficulty to prevent the royal army paſſing the Delaware, except the want of boats or pontoons. I did at Major Montreſor's requeſt, enquire whether

* Vide Mr. Galloway's anſwers to Lord George Germaine and Mr. Burke, firſt and ſecond day's examination, & *paſſim*.

there

there were any materials, with which pontoons or boats, or rafts might be conſtructed, and I *found* 48,000 *feet* of boards, a quantity of iron, and there was timber enough about Trenton. *I did not ſee the boards I mentioned**."

" One of the delegates in congreſs from the province of New-York, *was choſen* by *himſelf* and his *clerk*, and certified to congreſs that he was unanimouſly choſen. I ſat with him in congreſs, in 1774, and he was received by that body; his name was Bocrum.---The delegates of Maſſachuſet's Bay were choſen *much* in the *ſame* manner. *I do not know whether theſe delegates were fairly elected, as I never enquired into it, nor heard of it* †".

This is the *ſkull* of a *lawyer*, where be *now* his *quiddets*, his *quiltets*, and his *tricks?* You have heard him for ſome time, in his aſſumed character, of an *able* and *experienced* military commander; let us now hear him in the compound character of a *lawyer* and a *politician*, for which take his own words and not mine.

Mr. Galloway. " I have lived in America from my nativity, about forty-eight years. I have lived in the province of Maryland, in the Delaware counties, in Penſylvania, but chiefly in Philadelphia; my *profeſſion* was that of the *law*. I was a member of the aſſembly of Penſylvania, eighteen years; ſpeaker of the

* Vide Mr. Gallowey's ſecond day's examination before the Houſe of Commons.

† Ibid. firſt and ſecond day's.

houſe,

houſe, twelve; I was delegated by that aſſembly, to repreſent it in the American Congreſs, which met the 5th of September, 1774*.

We have heard this *Lawyer*, *Repreſentative*, *Speaker*, and *Congreſs Delegate* giving decided opinions upon the moſt *difficult abſtruſe* and *intricate* parts of the military art, both ſpeculative, practical, and mixed; it may not be incurious, to make a remark or two on the fatal effects ſometimes flowing from too *great* an attention paid to foreign purſuits at rather *too late* a period of life, in order to prove, that a great lawyer and politician after commencing a great General, is apt to *loſe* all *former ideas* of policy, legiſlation; and, in fact, to loſe himſelf too by falling into *novel habits* of *life*.

Mr. Galloway. " *I do not recollect* whether any cenſure of the *trial* or Quebec bill was contained in the aſſociation which I ſigned.—I did *not* read it before I *ſigned* it.—The ſubſtance of the aſſociation is really *out* of my *head*.—I *do not recollect* any *one* article of it—I ſat in the committee of grievances—It came, I *believe*, to a reſolution, ſtating the cruelty and injuſtice of the Boſton port, the charter, and the *trial* bills.—I *do not remember* particularly that I offered a proteſt againſt the Congreſs reſolves reſpecting the *above* bills.—I really *do not recollect* that the Congreſs came to a particular reſolution, ſtating that their

* Vide Mr. Galloway's firſt day's examination before the Houſe of Commons.

reaſonable

reaſonable petitions, &c. had been treated with contempt by his majeſty's miniſters.—I *imagine* I did *not* vote without conſidering the reſolution, declaring the illegality of keeping a ſtanding army in the colonies in time ofpeace.—I muſt have conſidered it in the courſe of the debate.—Relative to the claim of rights made by Congreſs I *have not* a *ſingle one* of them in my *memory* [handed to him].—I oppoſed the firſt and the fourth; the ſecond and third I *do not recollect*—The fifth I did not—Nor the ſixth—The ſeventh I *do not recollect*.—The *eighth* I muſt *have* oppoſed, but *do not recollect*—I was of a contrary opinion to the ninth, and, I *believe*, I oppoſed it.—I know I oppoſed ſeveral.—as to the *tenth* I do *not recollect*—I *may* have conſidered thoſe fundamental points as a *Lawyer*, but I *do not know* how frequently.—I *believe* I did attend to them ſeriouſly.—I *do not know* whether any ſuch idea entered into my head.—I do not doubt but that I *did think* of them.—I am ſpeaking of tranſactions that paſſed five years ago.*" We preſume five years was an error of the clerk for fifty, becauſe from the time of Mr. Galloway's quitting the Congreſs till the winter campaign in the Jerſies was not many months.

In anſwer to every argument built, and concluſion drawn by our hiſtorian from the

* Vide Mr. Galloway's ſecond day's examination.

evidence

evidence of *General Robertſon* and *Mr. Galloway*, I thought it neceſſary to point out to ſuch of my countrymen, whoſe ears are not ſtopped by the moſt incurable prejudices, whoſe underſtandings are not blinded or corrupted by ſelf intereſt, or whoſe ſentiments and opinions have not been warped through the arts and deluſions of a ſet of unprincipled ſcribblers, paid and employed by the authors of our preſent real and impending calamities, what degree of credit ſuch evidence is entitled to, and what may be expected by every officer naval or military, at preſent occupying principal commands, ſhould any diſaſter happen to them through the impracticability or inferior defects in the plans committed to their execution. What ſuch officers are *liable* to experience under *ſuch* a ſyſtem of government: what perhaps *ſome* of them in a very *few* months will experience; and perhaps already begin to have a foretaſte of, may be eaſily gathered from the court *murmers* and repeated abuſe, which every *now* and *then* the miniſterial prints teem with, reſpecting the conduct of Sir Charles Hardy, Admiral Byron, and Sir Henry Clinton.

I promiſed, before I laid down my pen, that I would diſabuſe the public, relative to the real motives of Admiral Keppel's refuſing to take any command under the preſent Adminiſtration, either as a public or private man;

man; becauſe in the firſt character he was perſuaded he could render no eſſential ſervice to his country, and in the ſecond, that it would end in an unavailing ſacrifice of his honour, to prove both of which, I beg leave to ſtate the following facts*:

Mr. Keppel was ſent out with twenty ſhips of the line, to meet twenty-ſeven or thirty-two. Lord Gower acknowledged *twenty-ſix**, though Mr. Keppel was aſſured by the Admiralty board, that the Breſt fleet did not exceed *ſeventeen*†.

When the admiral received an account of the *real* ſtrength of the French ſquadron he returned into port, *contrary* to his inſtructions, for a reinforcement, in order to preſerve his country, its navy, and its marine arſenals from deſtruction, for which he received *no* thanks, on the contary, his conduct was called in queſtion by a ſilent diſapprobation.

On his return the ſecond time into port, after the affair of the 27th of July, he was treated with the *ſame* marks of *coldneſs* and contemptuous ſilence, while a *private* meſſage of thanks from the *king* through the Admiralty board was conveyed to Sir Hugh Palliſer and the officers of his diviſion‡.

An accuſation from one of the officers

* Vide his ſpeech, 23d April, 1779.

† Vide Lord Mulgrave and Lord North's ſpeeches, 3d, 8th, and 22d March, and 19th of April, 1779.

‡ Vide Admiral Keppel's ſpeeches, 3d and 8th of March, and 19th of April, 1779.

of his ſquadron, whom he had charged with diſobedience of orders, was received at the end of *five* months, and an order from the Admiralty Board immediately iſſued the ſame day. In conſequence of that accuſation, he was brought to a court martial upon the unfounded, flimſy, treacherous pretext that the Board were legally compelled to ſend the charge to be enquired into, not having any diſcretionary power, to conſult and decide upon any of the apparent circumſtances of the caſe, though afterwards, *when* there was a queſtion framed upon the legal exiſtence of ſuch a diſcretionary power, by a gentleman of great abilities and experience in his profeſſion*, the doctrine was at once given up by the two firſt law officers of the crown †, and the motion met by the previous queſtion in order to avoid the conſequences of a vote which would have involved in it a cenſure of the Admiralty Board, and particularly of the Firſt Commiſſioner of the Admiralty §.

The refuſing a copy of ſuch part of the Admiral's inſtructions, as might be neceſſary to his defence, when on a trial for his life, under various pretended excuſes, that the papers deſired contained matters *not fit* to be made public; and when that objection was *removed*, the *tacitly* refuſing to grant the documents deſired, by taking no *further* notice of the application.

* Mr. Dunning. † Attorney and Solicitor General.
§ See the Commons debates of March 15th.

The

The *omitting*, in the official letters to the Admiral, on his acquittal, that part of the ſentence of the Court Martial, which contained an *honourable* and *decided* approbation of the Admiral's conduct, as well as that *other* part which *cenſured* the accuſer, and the charge under the epithets of *ill-founded* and *malicious*; and forbearing to add a *ſingle word* expreſſive of *their* (the Admiralty Board) ſatisfaction on the occaſion *.

The repeated denials of adminiſtration that they knew any thing of the intended accuſation, and their afterwards *acknowledging* that they did, and taking *merit* to themſelves, that they endeavoured to *diſſuade* the Vice Admiral from his purpoſe, though their diſſuaſions had *unfortunately failed?* †.

Their continuing to ſhew to Sir Hugh Palliſer every wonted mark of favour and confidence, after he had been accuſed by one of the moſt reſpectable Court Martials that ever ſat in this country, and that upon the evidence of a ſet of heroes and veterans, of the very firſt profeſſional reputation, till adminiſtration diſcovered that a motion of expulſion was intended, and was meant to be followed by an addreſs to the throne, to diſmiſs the falſe accuſer from all his poſts and places, civil and

* See the correſpondence between the Admiral and Mr. Stephens, ſecretary of the Admiralty, on this ſubject.

† Vide Lord Sandwich's ſpeech on the examination of Mr. Jackſon, under ſecretary of the Admiralty, March 31ſt, 1779, and the ſpeeches of Lord Mulgrave.

military, which, in the temper of the Houſe of Commons at the time, would have been carried by a very great majority, and might in its conſequences, have involved the ruin of themſelves *.

The general clamour raiſed by the emiſſaries and ſcribbling mercenaries in the pay of government, for his ſuppoſed refuſal of reſuming the command, while the miniſters declined to *communicate* with, or *deſire* him to reſume that command; and after his flag was ſtruck, and the Admiral gone to Bath, the confirming thoſe miſrepreſentations, by declaring in *Parliament*, that they had *again* ſolicited his ſervices †.

And finally, as the *laſt teſtimony* of their *rooted rancour*, trying the admiral a *ſecond* time, and endeavouring to *impeach* the *deciſion* of his *judges*, and the *evidence* on which they determined, by ſending the conduct of their *favourite tool* to be enquired into, by a *packed* court, who to juſtify the ſentence it was *intended* they *ſhould* give, were *not* to *hear* any of the *material* witneſſes. *Some*‡ could not be ſummoned, becauſe they were on diſtant ſervice; others were indiſpoſed; and many of

* Vide debates 21ſt and 25th February.

† See the debates of the 3d of March, in the Houſe of Commons, & *paſſim*.

‡ See Lord North's ſpeech on Mr. Fox's motion for a copy of the ſentence of the Court Martial on Sir Hugh Palliſer, April 23, and Admiral Keppel's reply.

thoſe who gave their teſtimony on the former trial, were *thought* unneceſſary to be examined on the latter *.

Here I cloſe my obſervations, and have only to add, that when I ſat down to write, I little imagined that they would have been extended to the length they neceſſarily have been. Theſe court-hirelings have an advantage over their antagoniſts, which is not to be combated without ſome labour and great patience; becauſe an affirmative falſhood of a few lines, frequently calls for an anſwer of as many pages. Without dread of riſking any thing, they affirm every thing. No ſooner is one *lie* diſproved or miſrepreſentation detected, but up ſtarts an hundred in its place. To defeat however, as much as may be, the ſucceſs of ſuch arts, I have endeavoured all in my power to ſtop up every avenue by which it was likely our hiſtorian might endeavour to eſcape detection and public diſgrace; diſgrace did I ſay! ſurely I might have ſuppreſſed that motive, as ſuppoſed to actuate the breaſt of any of the faction, when I recollect that the more deſpicable, ſervile, corrupt, and unprincipled they render themſelves in the *eyes* of the *honeſt*, *independent*, and *intelligent* part of the community, the more ſtrongly they recom-

* See debates on the Duke of Richmond's motion, 31ſt March, 1779, and Mr. Jackſon's evidence at the bar of the Houſe of Lords, relative to his mode of carrying on the proſecution ſame day.

mend

mend themſelves to the author of that monſtrous ſyſtem of policy, which has marked the *annals* of the preſent—*miniſters*,—or the *reign* of their *ſovereign* lords, the junto, who by their endeavours to *cruſh* or *corrupt* every appearance of *public principle* or *private integrity*, have long laid their account, in being able to introduce and eſtabliſh a ſpecies of government, ſuited to the extent of folly, and criminal baſeneſs of men, weak enough to be cheated, or corrupt enough to part with on motives of perſonal intereſts, the bleſſings of that conſtitution, which had rendered a ſpot of earth, far from being naturally fertile, one of the greateſt powers the world has ſeen ſince the diſſolution of the Roman empire.

POST-

POSTSCRIPT.

To the AUTHOR.

WHATEVER truth or juſtice there may be in your Short Hiſtory or my obſervations, muſt be left to the deciſion of an impartial and diſcerning public; but from this *conflict*, one *melancholy* truth may be gathered, that this country is verging faſt towards certain deſtruction, or national degradation. She will perhaps not long continue in an independent ſtate, though I think that hardly probable; but if ſhe ſhould, there is not the moſt diſtant proſpect, the moſt remote probability, that ſhe will ever reſume her wonted ſtation among the *firſt* powers in Europe.

It is not, Sir, your *fanfaronneries* about our calamities during the firſt Dutch war, the diſtreſſed ſtate of this country in the reign of King William; nor the threatened invaſion of the Invincible Armada, in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, every one of which, the united zeal, perſeverance, and ſteady efforts of the nation ſo happily ſurmounted, that is ſufficient to raiſe the drooping ſpirits of the people, *crouching* under accumulating *burdens*; and become *inſenſible* to danger and approaching ruin, by the falſe hopes and confident aſſertions of hireling writers or hireling orators. The preſent times materially differ from thoſe periods, which you dwell upon with ſo much exultation, and which, though liable to change of fortune, did not generate diſappointment, deſpair, and defeat, as effects

fects reſulting from radical cauſes and native imbecility.

In 1588, when Philip the Second attempted to invade this kingdom, the whole of the annual ſupplies, including the civil liſt revenue, did not amount to the expences incurred in the year 1778, under the *ſingle* article of army extraordinaries, even allowing for the comparative difference of the value of money at both periods. The *coffers* of that princeſs were *full*; ſhe *employed* the public purſe like a *faithful* ſteward, to the exigencies of the ſtate: as yet, no *balance* of power *founded* in *influence* on the part of the crown, and *dependence* on that of parliament, was publicly avowed, and the *neceſſity* of both *defended* by a court writer. She was a wiſe princeſs, *for* ſhe employed very few but *great* and *able* miniſters. She had perſonal favourites, but *no* political ones: and by an addreſs, no leſs rare than fortunate, ſhe reconciled ſeveral jarring intereſts, and drew their collected force to a fixed point of union; that of promoting the proſperity of their country. The Cecilian, the Leiceſtrian, the Eſſexian, or Stuart faction, might endeavour to thwart each other, and undermine their rivals in her favour, but as ſhe dealt out her rewards with an even hand, and eſtabliſhed merit as the *only ſure recommendation*; ſhe was therefore ably and faithfully ſerved throughout her whole reign, and has left an example behind her worthy to be imitated by all her royal ſucceſſors.

If you are ſerious, in comparing the calamities of the years 1665 and *ſix*, and the burning a few ſhips at Chatham; to thoſe which at preſent terminate our view of the political horizon on every ſide, you can hardly expect from me a ſerious

anſwer;

anſwer; if not, but only have done it to chace away the ſpleen, the nervous and valetudinary part of your readers, it would ill become me to endeavour to baniſh thoſe viſionary gleams of comfort, which cauſe a temporary ſuſpenſion of thoſe habitual impreſſions, and imbitter their wretched exiſtence. It would reſemble the formality of a phyſician of Toledo, who having pronounced his patient incurable, prohibited the uſe of opium, and inſiſted, that the patient ſhould *die* by the rules of art, in the moſt excruciating torments.

The *cordial* you have extracted from the ſtate of this country, in the reign of King William, though not *forced* by the political alembic heated over the *great* fire of London, calls for a remark or two. The naval engagement off Beachy, in the year 1690, you repreſent as terminating in a *total* defeat? you affirm we loſt *eight* ſhips of the line; and that the French rode triumphant in the Channel, inſulting our ſea-ports, and threatening our ſea-coaſts with invaſion. Now, Sir, as I have the authority of a perſon who ſerved aboard that fleet, now before me, and was afterwards ſecretary of the Admiralty for upwards of twenty-five years, who affirms, that *no* Engliſh ſhip was taken or deſtroyed, but *one* called the Royal Anne, which run on ſhore near Winchelſea, and which the Captains burnt, to prevent her falling into the hands of the enemy *, you will pardon me if I doubt the fact. This, I believe, is a ſufficient proof of the *credit* you deſerve, in *any* thing which relates to *hiſtorical narrative.* I could prove, were it worth my while, that the impreſſion of our imaginary diſtreſſes at that time which you have given,

* Vide Burchett's Hiſtory of the Naval Tranſactions at Sea.

is a baſe counterfeit. You forgot however to exhibit the reverſe to your readers, and to inform them that King William, the *next day* after Beachy fight, gained a compleat victory over the Iriſh at the Boyne, commanded by the abdicated king; by which means, more than half that kingdom inſtantly ſubmitted. You *forgot* to inform them, that Holland, the Emperor, Spain, and the empire, were our allies; and, that we had none to contend with but *France alone.* You forgot to inform them, that Marlborough, Peterborough, Galway, Stanhope, and all thoſe diſtinguiſhed officers, who afterwards contributed to the victories of Blenheim, Ramilies, and Malplaquet, were then ſerving in our armies; and Ruſſel, Delaval, Shovel and Rook, employed and entruſted with the command of our fleets; that a Godolphin, a Sunderland, and a Somers *directed* our councils; that the whole national debt did not amount to *two* millions; and that *no* cement, formed by *reciprocal influence* and *dependance* between the *crown* and *parliament*, exiſted, but what *common intereſt*, *common ſafety*, and a *firm* determination to preſerve thoſe liberties the nation had juſt wreſted out of the hands of a *perjured* and *ungrateful* tyrant, dictated. Theſe united, formed the *palladium* of our ſecurity. The confidence of the people was *then* founded in wiſdom; the means were commenſurate to the ends, and ably directed, for they led to and obtained them.

At the *firſt* period, we could boaſt of a Burleigh, and a Walſingham; at the ſecond, of a Clarendon and a Southampton; at the third, of a Godolphin and a Somers: you yourſelf will *bluſh* at the *fourth*; you will redden and hold down your head

at

at the *degrading contraſt*—" and we can now *boaſt* of a North and a Germaine !" I ſicken at the compariſon. Methinks I behold the *genius* of Britain, *diſſolved* in *tears*, overwhelmed in the deepeſt diſtreſs, and all her *ancient* enemies with diſtended ſides, almoſt convulſed by ſucceſſive peals of laughter !

I come now to the particular ſubject that has been the occaſion of writing this poſtſcript, which I mean to treat very briefly, as the matter I mean to animadvert upon, is contained within a very narrow compaſs.

Your firſt poſition is, that ambition is inherent in human nature ; and as an active principle, urges individuals to aſpire to diſtinction and pre-eminence among their fellow-citizens †. A moſt noble principle it is, and the fountain of all great and glorious actions ; but, Sir, give me leave to tell you, though you have defined it by *reference*, as you proceed under the *general* name of ambition, you have artfully avoided the diſtinction ; that is, between a *falſe* and *true* ambition ; an ambition to ſerve ones *ſelf*, or their country ; of an ambition founded in *virtue* ; of doing good ; and of gratifying vicious inclinations ; of being the protector of the liberties of a man's country, and of publicly trampling upon, or ſecretly undermining them ; of being the ſcourge of his fellow-citizens, and their ſaviour and deliverer. So far I believe you will at leaſt *publicly* agree with me. I deſire no more for the preſent.

Your next poſition is, that the means uſed to obtain diſtinction and pre-eminence, are various,

† Pages 1 and 2, *& paſſim.*

and are *accommodated* to the ſpirit of the government under which people live. I ſhall paſs over thoſe means, as they are ſuppoſed to operate in deſpotic monarchies. In republics, the means you obſerve, are gaining the confidence, or *ſeducing* the *principles* of the people; in free limited governments, you tell us, the neareſt road to power, lies *between* ſeduction, on one hand, as in the republics; or the favour of the prince, who is the fountain of all preferment, and is generally procured by *intrigue* and *addreſs*, in deſpotic monarchies.

If the *neareſt* road to *power* lies between thoſe two extremes, one or the other of theſe concluſions muſt follow; that *none* of thoſe are the *means* proper to be employed, to obtain diſtinction in a mixed government like that of Great Britain; or, that the government being *mixed*, ſo ought be the means, which are you ſay, *intrigue* and *addreſs*; and *ſeducing* the *principles* of the *people*. I ſubſcribe moſt chearfully to this doctrine, if you will confeſs, that public ſeduction and perſonal flattery, however ſucceſsful it may operate, aided by intrigue and addreſs, upon a weak or ſhort-ſighted prince, or upon a credulous and deluded people, are *not* the means to procure *honourable* pre-eminence, and *honeſt* diſtinction.

You may anſwer, that many have attained both by ſuch means: granted, and you might have added, many will. As long as *avarice*, *treachery*, *meanneſs*, *want* of principle, *falſhood*, and the whole black catalogue of vices continue to inhabit the human breaſt, there *will* be *pretenders* who will ſeduce; there will be *knaves* to *ſell*, and *villains* to *purchaſe*; there will be *flatterers* to *daub*, *whiſperers* to *miſrepreſent* and *betray*, and *traitors* worthy of an

axe,

axe, a gibbet, or an halter, many of whom will by ſuch means be advanced to *diſtinction* and pre-eminence; but I no more perceive the neceſſity of gratifying ſuch a ſpecies of ambition, than I do of truſting my houſe to a known burglar, or my purſe to an highwayman. Every other ſpecies of vice, as well as public ſeduction and impoſition, is common to human nature, and more or leſs inherent in it. It does not however follow, that government ought to tolerate, much leſs encourage, promote, and call forth into *ſucceſsful* exiſtence, what it was primarily inſtituted to correct and ſuppreſs.

Having eſtabliſhed public ſeduction and intrigue as the *baſis* of your ſcheme of government, your next poſition, I confeſs, is a *fair* deduction from the *premiſes*. You ſay the revolution, though it made but few changes in the forms of authority, eſtabliſhed a *balance* between the crown and the people, which a little lower you deſcribe to be a mutual or reciprocal dependance of the crown on the repreſentatives of the people, and of the repreſentatives back again on the crown.

I have often heard of ſuch a balance, and ſuch a dependance within and without doors; but I confeſs it is the *firſt* time I ever ſaw it directly ſtated in print; and you put the point beyond the poſſibility of being miſrepreſented; for you add, *mutual dependance* is *created* by the *poſſeſſion* of the *means* of conferring *mutual favours*. Common prudence, you ſay, directs the choice of a prince, *where* to *chuſe* his ſervants ſtanding in need of *ſupplies*, he will ſelect thoſe who have the power of adminiſtring to his wants.

This

This, I confeſs, is ſpeaking pretty plain, and brings to my memory, when I was laſt in Eaſt-Frieſland, the mode of courting in that country. The parents or friends of the young couple aſſemble on the day of courtſhip in a large room, at one end of which there is a kind of bench raiſed about three feet above the floor, on which the intended bride ſits.

The bridegroom enters in his beſt array, and ſalutes all her friends; and advancing to the middle of the room, makes three low bows to his intended bride. He then makes his obeiſance to her, on which ſhe leaves her ſeat. On which he takes her by the hand, and in a light eaſy manner tells her, "I *want*, my dear, what you *have*;" to which ſhe laconnically replies, "My dear, I *want* what *you* have." This is an immediate contract, the conſequence of which is, that the miniſter, who is waiting in an outer chamber, is inſtantly called in, and the parties are married.

Whether this new *balance* of yours was formed on the model of a Dutch courtſhip, I will not pretend to ſay; or whether it was really introduced by ſome of the Dutch favourites, towards the concluſion of King William's reign; bur I never heard before, that it was the political *vinculum* which bound or married a *King* of *Great Britain* to the *repreſentatives* of the people, and they back again to a *ſervile* dependance on his *miniſters*.

I will not venture to controvert a matter of which, by your own ſituation, or rather the diſtinction and pre-eminence of your friends, you may be better informed of than I pretend to be. My thoughts reached no further than bare ſuſpicion. Suſpicion will henceforward give way to evidence

of

of a ſuperior nature. The other important diſcovery, however, that this leads to, deſerves a little attention. But as candidates were more numerous than offices, the diſappointed never failed, you ſay, to perſecute the ſucceſsful, till by watching faults, errors, or misfortunes, they obtained their point, and they themſelves became in turn the objects of attack. This, I am ready to acknowledge, is at once penetrating into the marrow of things, and forms your firſt grand corollary. Every man is ambitious, that is, he firſt *ſeduces* the *people*, and *gains* their confidence. He afterwards goes with this confidence, and *ſells* it to the Miniſter, or the Sovereign. As there are not *as many* places as there are *candidates*, ſome neceſſarily remain unprovided for, and continue to thwart and obſtruct government, till they replace their opponents, who worry them in turn. This is not a very favourable picture of humam nature, in the ſeveral political phraſes it preſents in our hemiſphere. If it be a true repreſentation of it, in its ſtationary revolutions, I cannot but lament the ſevere trial providence hath allotted for our preſent moſt gracious and pious Sovereign, who is neceſſarily compelled by an union of *natural* as well as *factitious* cauſes to permit or ſuffer his miniſters to *countenance* a ſyſtem of *habitual* and *confirmed treachery* and *villainy*, not, I dare ſay, to be equalled by any other nation, but the inhabitants of a certain extenſive tract of country, called the infernal regions.

But, Sir, what follows next is much more to the purpoſe than any part of your introductory diſquiſitions. Men, you ſay, who wiſhed to be employed, took care to ſupport in their *appearances* the

the *principles* of the *people*, that is, they were guilty of *public ſeduction*. No diſtinction was made between *whig* and *tory*; each party adopted thoſe principles, and aſſumed to themſelves the appellation of *popular*; but the preſent reign, on account of ſeveral circumſtances, was *calculated* to *put an end* to all *fooliſh pretenſions* to *popularity*. The concluſion is evident. The door of preferment was thrown open to every *other* deſcription of men, but ſuch as retained *popular* principles or popular *prejudices*. I moſt ſincerely believe it; and the *ſecret* is *come out*. Every man's political fortunes are *preſcribed*, who dare to court popular opinion. While that continued to be the neareſt road to preferment, it was much frequented. Popular ſeduction is now *no* longer practiſed but by thoſe who have been already entered in the *black book*, and whoſe fate is conſequently decided. The *way* to *honours* and *preferment* is now by a much *nearer* road, and our government is no longer a *mixed* government; for no man, as it is at preſent adminiſtered, can ever expect to arrive at *diſtinction* or *pre-eminence* among his fellow citizens, who either *is*, or *dares* to *pretend*, that he wiſhes to be *popular*, even through the arts of popular ſeduction. Government is at length happily *ſimplified*, and brought back to its *true* and *original* ſtandard; the *favour* of the *Prince*, who is the *fountain* of *preferment*; which preferment is procured by *addreſs* and *intrigue*.

Under *ſuch* a government and *ſuch* a *ſyſtem* of *active* policy, it is now impoſſible for any *real* or *pretended* patriot ever to ſucceed; if he be a *real* one, what right have the people to *dictate* to their *Sovereign* about the *choice* of his ſervants? If *pretended*

tended, ſurely every well wiſher to his country ought to *rejoice* to ſee the *factious* pretender diſappointed; ſo that in either event, the *effect* is the *ſame*; no man *can* expect to taſte of the *fountain* of *preferment*, even though it were to cool his jaws, parched up with the *heat* of real or pretended patriotiſm, unleſs he can *procure* it by intrigue or addreſs.

This may be the court creed of the year 1779, but if hiſtory does not miſinform us, it was not ſuch a creed that kept King William on the throne in ſpite of all his enemies foreign and domeſtic, nor *called* the Hanover family out of the *ſtrict* line of hereditary ſucceſſion to fill the conſtitutional office, of *firſt magiſtrate* in a free country. I ſhall conclude with a ſhort quotation, perfectly applicable to the ſubject of this addreſs, from a well known political writer.

" Let the illuſtrious and royal that hath been called to the government of theſe kingdoms, govern them as long as Providence ſhall ordain! but let the *ſpirit* as well as *letter* of the conſtitution they are *entruſted* to *preſerve*, be, as it ought to be, and as we promiſe ourſelves it will be, the *ſole rule* of their government, and the *ſole ſupport* of their *power*; and whatever happens in the various courſe of human contingencies, whatever be the fate of *particular* perſons, of *houſes*, or *families*, let the *liberties* of Great Britain be *immortal*."

St. James's Palace,
Auguſt 4, 1779.

The Author.